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Targeted advertising—the process by which advertisers direct their message at a 
specific demographic—is neither a recent1 nor an irrational phenomenon.2  One 
industry executive has proclaimed it the “rare win for everyone” because it serves 
producers, advertisers, and consumers alike.3  It should be no surprise that the 
Information sector of the online economy—particularly new and social media 
platforms4 with robust access to consumer data—has structured revenue streams to 
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 1. See Noah Bartolucci, Exhibit Presents History of Targeted Advertising, DUKE TODAY (Apr. 27, 
2001), https://perma.cc/4638-LUFQ.  The Perkins Library on the campus of Duke University presented 
“Moving Targets:  Marketing to a Changing America (1890-2001),” a retrospective of targeted 
advertising. 
 2. Particularized appeals to consumers with a demonstrated interest or inclination to purchase a 
good or service are a rational economic decision on the part of the marketer with derivative benefits to the 
consumer.  By providing that consumers who desire a good end up purchasing it, targeted advertising 
ensures the market “clears” and reduces deadweight loss. 
 3. See If A Consumer Asked You, “Why Is Tracking Good?”, What Would You Say?, 
ADEXCHANGER (Oct. 28, 2011), https://perma.cc/UA67-55CG (quoting David Nelson, Operations & IT 
Director, Unanimis.co.uk).  But see Joseph Turow, Michael Hennessy & Nora Draper, The Tradeoff 
Fallacy: How Marketers Are Misrepresenting American Consumers and Opening Them Up to 
Exploitation, ANNENBERG SCH. FOR COMMC’N (2015), https://perma.cc/MAS9-9QJA], discussed Part III, 
infra (concluding “most Americans do not believe that ‘data for discounts’ is a square deal.”). 
 4. Jason Pridmore & Lalu Elias Hämäläinen, Market Segmentation in (In)Action: Marketing and 
‘Yet to Be Installed’ Role of Big and Social Media Data, 42 Historical Social Research / Historische 
Sozialforschung 103, 114 (2017), https://perma.cc/58DW-Y5B2 (“Social media and new media are said 
to provide significant opportunities for marketers.  Despite some reservations, these are seen to provide 
the potential for enhanced customer engagement particularly as these allow consumers to voluntarily self-
segment in relation to a number of categories.  These means of engagement and the ability of new 
technologies to track consumer behaviour have significantly contributed to the development of “big 
data.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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benefit from targeted advertising.5  These platforms generate “substantially all of 
[their] revenue from advertising,” which in turn rely on active user engagement.6 
The Internet Information Economy is premised on the free flowing exchange of 
data and limited barriers to its collection and transmission.7  New and social media,8 
including Google, Facebook, and LinkedIn, sustain themselves on a quid pro quo 
exchange of monetizable user data for a wide array of nominally gratuitous services.9  
This free flow of data has revolutionized how marketers reach their desired 
audiences.10  Advertisers are willing to pay a premium for targeted advertisements 
with the expectation that the investment yields dividends.11  Currently, the 
technological prowess of new and social media platforms outpaces the existing 
regulatory landscape.12  However, these businesses contend with risks relating to the 
 
 5. In its most recent annual filing, Facebook reported generating over $40 billion in revenue.  
Facebook Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 14 (Feb. 1, 2018).  Although North American Facebook users 
account for roughly half of Facebook’s revenue, these accountholders only constitute 11.5% of its user 
base.  The as of yet untapped users outside the United States and Canada provide Facebook and similar 
platforms with new growth sectors in Asia and other developing markets.  See Felix Richter, Facebook’s 
Growth Potential Lies Abroad, STATISTA (Nov. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/XA5R-ZNPM. 
 6. Facebook Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 8–9, 14 (Feb. 1, 2018).  Among its risk factors, 
Facebook lists diminished user experience “as a result of the decisions [they] make with respect to the 
frequency, prominence, format, size, and quality of ads that [they] display,” “terms, policies, or procedures 
related to areas such as sharing, content, user data, or advertising that are perceived negatively by 
[Facebook] users or the general public,” and “[u]nfavorable publicity regarding … privacy practices … 
the actions of [their] advertisers.”  Id.  In its filing, Facebook reported that it generated 98% of its revenue 
from third party advertisers.  Id. 
 7. The term information economy, as distinct from a manufacturing economy, is one in which 
“information is the core resource for creating wealth.”  Shoshana Zuboff, The Emperor’s New Workplace: 
Information Technology Evolves More Quickly Than Behavior, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Sept. 1995, at 202, 
http://www.nature.com.ezproxy.cul.columbia.edu/scientificamerican/journal/v273/n3/pdf/scientificameri
can0995-190.pdf.  This Note modifies the term to emphasize how platforms available on the Internet have 
made it possible to approach a true information economy, where we no longer transact in goods and 
services but pay via information. 
 8. Pridmore & Hämäläinen, supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
 9. In February 2017, Facebook reported an average revenue per North American user of $19.81, 
derived from monetizing user data.  Alexei Oreskovic, Facebook Now Gets Almost $20 from Each US and 
Canadian User, Compared to Under $5 at its IPO, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/RR7N-
B7PV.  While this Note alludes to the vast array of services championed under the Internet Information 
Economy model, it will focus on Facebook’s particular advertisement delivery system as a benchmark for 
proposing regulation.  
 10. Caitlin Dewey, 98 Personal Data Points that Facebook Uses to Target Ads to You, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/L5WD-KLE9.  In 2016, digital media displaced television in terms 
of revenues generated domestically, generating an estimated $72.5 billion in sales. George Slefo, Desktop 
and Mobile Ad Revenue Surpasses TV for the First Time, ADAGE (Apr. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/38SQ-
PC8U; see also Sydney Ember, Ads Evolve into New Forms as Media Landscape Shifts, N.Y. TIMES (May 
8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/09/business/media/ads-evolve-into-new-forms-as-media-
landscape-shifts.html?_r=0.  
 11. Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2010), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703940904575395073512989404. 
 12. On April 10, 2018, Facebook’s CEO and founder, Mark Zuckerberg appeared before the 
Committees on the Judiciary and Commerce, Science and Transportation to testify in the light of the recent 
revelation that Cambridge Analytica had obtained the data of approximately 300,000 Facebook users by 
means of a quiz application.  Senator Thune, Chairman of the Commerce Committee admitted to the 
purposeful delay in regulations:  “In the past, many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle have been 
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nature of targeted advertising, including the propensity to mislead consumers,13 and 
concomitant concerns about user privacy.14 
Acknowledging the ubiquity of targeted advertising and Internet Information 
Economy participants’ market share and political will, this Note proposes several 
policies for regulating such data collection and transmission practices.  Calls for 
regulations on targeted advertisements—particularly those linked to new and social 
media—are likely to be met with claims of a First Amendment violation, and 
invocations of the Commercial Speech Doctrine.15  While the core of the Commercial 
Speech Doctrine captures speech proposing a commercial transaction,16 it also 
encompasses “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and 
its audience.”17  Targeted advertising hosted on Internet Information Economy 
platforms poses a unique challenge to this paradigm.  Its reliance on consumer data 
directly implicates the consumer more so than with “traditional” commercial 
speech.18 
 
willing to defer to tech companies’ efforts to regulate themselves, but this may be changing.”  Transcript 
of Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, Wash. Post (Apr. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/8URT-XY9W; see also 
Facebook Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 16 (Feb. 1, 2018) (“[T]he application, interpretation, and 
enforcement of [U.S. federal and state and foreign laws and regulations] are often uncertain, particularly 
in the new and rapidly evolving industry in which we operate, and may be interpreted and applied 
inconsistently . . . For example, regulatory or legislative actions affecting the manner in which we display 
content to our users or obtain consent to various practices could adversely affect user growth and 
engagement.”). 
 13. Facebook, Facebook Here Together (UK), YOUTUBE (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q4zd7X98eOs.  In the spring of 2018, Facebook admitted to its users’ 
data being compromised. In an effort to restore customer goodwill, Facebook released an advertising 
campaign in which Facebook employed the passive voice to describe the series of recent news items and 
pitfalls facing the company, seemingly to shift blame away from the company.  The text of the campaign 
is excerpted in relevant part:  “But then something happened.  We had to deal with spam clickbait, spam, 
data misuse.  That’s going to change.  From now on, Facebook will do more to keep you safe and protect 
your privacy.” 
 14. Tiffany Hsu & Cecilia Kang, Demands Grow for Facebook to Explain Its Privacy Policies, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/technology/ftc-facebook-
investigation-cambridge-analytica.html.  A 2014 Pew Research Center study concluded, inter alia, that 
80% of users expressed concern regarding data privacy, including access to personal data by third party 
entities, such as advertisers or businesses.  Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About 
Privacy, Security and Surveillance, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/9NYL-QUMJ. 
 15. The Commercial Speech Doctrine grew out of a compromise to recognize certain, albeit 
limited, First Amendment protections for commercial speech but not to accord it the full panoply of 
protection reserved for ‘higher value’ political speech.  See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 
484, 499 (1996) (citing Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 12–15, 903 (2d ed. 1998) (“The 
entire commercial speech doctrine . . . represents an accommodation between the right to speak and hear 
expression about goods and services and the right of government to regulate the sales of such goods and 
services.”). 
 16. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 
638 (1990).  
 17. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).  Commercial 
speech has also been as broadly defined as “[s]peech which promotes at least some type of commerce.”  
Commercial Speech, WEX, https://perma.cc/65M4-CCZJ (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). 
 18. See generally David Ingram, Facebook Nears Ad-only Business Model as Game Revenue Falls, 
REUTERS (May 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/LPV4-ZCY7; Melissa Block, How Does Facebook Generate 
Ad Revenue, NPR (Feb 1. 2012), https://perma.cc/2JSC-YFVC. 
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In order to develop an appropriate standard of review for potential regulations, 
this Note first addresses data collection and transmission methods in the light of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding commercial speech.  Although the 
Supreme Court considered data mining in the context of a commercial speech case 
in 2011, the Court ultimately left more questions open than answered.19  Rather than 
confront the commercial speech question directly, the Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health 
Inc. invalidated a patient privacy law on viewpoint discrimination grounds and 
applied “heightened scrutiny” without further elucidation.  In acknowledging the 
narrow grounds on which the case was decided, the Court motioned to the status of 
data collection and transmission as a contentious open issue for future cases to 
address, including whether data flows qualify as speech.20  Circuit court decisions 
have concluded that Sorrell did not rewrite commercial speech jurisprudence. 
Instead, the intermediate scrutiny test announced in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York continues to be good law.21 
However, Sorrell showed that a growing contingent of Justices are inclined to find 
incidental burdens on speech that trigger First Amendment analysis as a way to avoid 
reading regulations as primarily addressing economic concerns.  Effectively, these 
members of the Court have chiseled away at the government’s ability to promulgate 
regulations on commercial speakers.  Simultaneously, the Court has broadened the 
scope of its inquiry when striking regulations.  Whereas in its nascence, commercial 
speech was judged through the lens of the consumer, the Court has begun to give 
more heft to the interests of the commercial speaker.22  While neutral in theory, 
listener and speaker interests may not always align so congruently. 
The critical concern for regulators in the Internet Information Economy post-
Sorrell is whether there exists an appropriate balance between the speaker’s interest 
in data collection and transmission and the consumer’s interest in privacy and 
receiving accurate information without running afoul of the First Amendment.  The 
ability to manipulate direct-to-consumer messaging via data collection and 
transmission challenges the original conceit of the Commercial Speech Doctrine to 
increase consumer information and to prevent fraud and coercion.  Indeed, the 
government has largely ceded any regulatory imperative to the Internet Information 
Economy platforms themselves, without creating a satisfying oversight 
mechanism.23 
 
 19. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 20. Id. at 579 (“The capacity of technology to find and publish personal information, including 
records required by the government, presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to personal 
privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure.”). 
 21. Although Sorrell notably used the phrase “heightened scrutiny” as applied in a commercial 
speech case, the intermediate framework has long since been subject to threat.  Id. at 586.  See Martin H. 
Redish & Kyle Voils, False Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: Understanding the 
Implications of the Equivalency Principle, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 774 (2017) (“The Supreme 
Court has not upheld governmental suppression of truthful commercial speech in more than twenty 
years.”). 
 22. See generally Leslie Kendrick, Are Speech Rights for Speakers?, 103 VA. L. REV. 1767 (2017).  
 23. For example, the December 2017 vote by the Federal Communications Commission to end 
“Net Neutrality” represents further deregulation of the Internet, albeit towards specific entities, namely 
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This Note argues first, that the Commercial Speech Doctrine as currently 
conceived is an ill-fitting tool for resolving difficult free speech questions in the 
context of data, privacy, and the modern Internet Information Economy.  The 
application of the Commercial Speech Doctrine to a particular economic interaction 
should not be a nigh-complete bar to the regulation of Internet platforms that profit 
from data collection and transmission.24  For this reason, qualified constitutional 
protection appropriately accounts for the speaker’s interests while not short-changing 
those of the listener/consumer.  This Note proposes that regulators and reviewing 
tribunals consider the context surrounding the data collection and transmission 
process, including: method of collection, relationship between miner and mined 
party, and whether the user has consented to such collection in justifying the relative 
need for regulation.25  Second, in order to vindicate the Commercial Speech 
Doctrine’s initial purposes, more transparency of data collection procedures for use 
in targeted advertising is warranted and indeed possible as a regulatory hook to 
protect consumers, despite the Court’s move towards according more protection to 
commercial speakers. 
In so doing, this Note builds upon Erin Bernstein and Theresa J. Lee’s Where the 
Consumer Is the Commodity: The Difficulty with the Current Definition of 
Commercial Speech, which proposes that the “rise of new non-linear commercial 
transactions” necessitates a shift in the definition of commercial speech to 
accommodate the seismic change in the modern online economy.26  The stakes are 
not inconsequential:  failure to expand the scope of commercial speech would 
foreclose the use of many tools in a legislature’s arsenal to address current concerns 
related to consumer privacy and eliminating advertisements that seek to capitalize on 
discriminatory indicia,27 among other salient policy issues.28 
Part I details the Court’s jurisprudence regarding both personal solicitations and 
data practices and considers the shift away from a bifurcated speech paradigm that 
 
ISPs.  See Brian Fung, The FCC Just Voted to Repeal its Net Neutrality Rules, in a Sweeping Act of 
Deregulation, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/8Q9D-56XC.  
 24. Cf. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567 (“[T]he First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at 
commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech.”). 
 25. In analyzing the nexus between data collection and transmission and commercial speech, this 
Note recognizes the argument in favor of finding that data collection ought not be regulated stems from 
the potential chilling effect on information collection.  However, extending this argument to sweep in all 
data verges on Lochnerizing the very foundation of the modern Internet Information Economy and 
privileging the commercial speaker above all else.  For a defense of this argument, see Jane Bambauer, Is 
Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63 (2014).  
 26. Erin Bernstein & Theresa J. Lee, Where the Consumer Is the Commodity: The Difficulty with 
the Current Definition of Commercial Speech, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 39, 41 (2013).  The authors 
advocate for redefining “the commercial in an information economy.” Id. at 71.  
 27. See Julia Angwin et al., Facebook Job Ads Raise Concerns About Age Discrimination, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/business/facebook-job-ads.html, discussed 
infra (outlining concerns that Facebook’s “microtargeting” advertising platform may violate Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act by systematically excluding certain viewers from 
advertisements based on their demographics). 
 28. Should commercial speech made by Google or Facebook be cabined to only that which 
“propose[s] a transaction,” attempts to regulate these platforms will be scrutinized under a heightened 
standard for non-commercial speech.  Bernstein & Lee, supra note 26, at 42–44. 
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treats commercial speech as speech of “lesser value.”  Part II illustrates the most 
common forms of data collection and transmission.  Part III locates these methods of 
data collection and transmission within the current commercial speech framework to 
conclude that qualified constitutional protection is the coherent tier of scrutiny that 
should apply.  Part IV proposes policy recommendations that fit within the Court’s 
current approach to commercial speech and alternatives that would require a 
departure from the present doctrine. 
I. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
Although commercial speech falls under the umbrella of the First Amendment, 
the Supreme Court has deemed it deserving of less than full constitutional protection.  
In Central Hudson, the Court announced an intermediate level of scrutiny test to be 
applied to regulations of commercial speech.29  Provided that the speech is neither 
misleading nor relates to unlawful activity, the regulation must:  (i) further a 
“substantial” regulatory interest; (ii) be proportionate to that interest; and (iii) 
“directly advance” that interest.30 
In order to analyze fruitfully any proposed regulation of data collection and 
transmission, this Note reviews the Court’s nebulous jurisprudence regarding 
targeted advertising.  This Part also examines Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,31 as it both 
represents the Court’s latest articulation of the applicable standards of review and 
indicates gaps that regulators might exploit.  The basis on which Sorrell was decided 
does not make it binding precedent with regard to how future courts may evaluate a 
future commercial speech case.  However, it is relevant in illustrating the modern 
Court’s discomfort with the bifurcated conception of commercial speech as 
intrinsically of lower value. 
A. JURISPRUDENCE RELATED TO PERSONAL SOLICITATIONS 
Targeted solicitations predate modern digitized technology.  Early case law 
evaluating the legality of targeting arose out of professionals soliciting prospective 
clients.32  Despite the divorced factual scenario presented in these early cases, the 
 
 29. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 573 (1980) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration in the original) (“Under this four-part test a restraint on 
commercial ‘communication [that] is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity’ is subject to an 
intermediate level of scrutiny.”). 
 30. Id. at 564 (majority opinion). 
 31. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
 32. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978).  In Ohralik, the Court upheld 
a prophylactic ban on an attorney’s in-person solicitations, finding a sufficiently “substantial” regulatory 
interest in corralling its bar licensees and protecting the public from harmful solicitation.  In subsequent 
cases, the Court acknowledged the narrow holding of Ohralik, due in no small part to the “unique features” 
associated with the particular solicitations in the case—the petitioner attorney had solicited business from 
injured individuals lying in hospice.  Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774 (1993); see also Zauderer v. 
Off. of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985) (noting, among other things, 
that “[i]n-person solicitation by a lawyer . . . was a practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, 
invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud” and “that in-person solicitation 
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principles articulated in evaluating the permissibility of regulations can apply to 
modern day targeted advertising. 
In Edenfield v. Fane, the Court invalidated a ban on personalized solicitations sent 
by certified public accountants.33  Broadly, the Court held that “the constitutionality 
of a ban on personal solicitation will depend upon the identity of the parties and the 
precise circumstances of the solicitation.”34  In determining whether to uphold a ban 
on personal solicitation, the Court articulated a multi-factor balancing test 
examining:  (i) whether the speaker is a “professional trained in the art of 
persuasion;” (ii) whether the speaker has an incentive to act responsibly when 
engaged in solicitation; (iii) the susceptibility of a listener to “manipulation,” which 
contemplates how sophisticated the listener is; (iv) whether the listener has an 
“independent basis” for evaluating the solicitation; (v) whether the listener has some 
existing professional relationship with the speaker; and (vi) whether the listener can 
rationally consider the advertisement as opposed to merely “acquiesc[ing].”35 
The Court concentrated on protecting the interests of the listener—in this case, 
the prospective future client.36  As described below, the Edenfield factors can provide 
regulators a means to measure the viability of proposed legislation on Internet 
Information Economy platforms. 
B. CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING DATA:  SORRELL 
Although Sorrell v. IMS Health engaged the Court in a substantive examination 
of data collection and transmission methods, the grounds on which the Court decided 
the case renders it not binding precedent for commercial speech cases.  However, it 
is instructive insofar as it reveals drafting pitfalls.  In dicta, the Court impliedly 
questioned the continued viability of the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny 
standard, leading to some confusion in lower courts.37  In this respect, Sorrell 
continued the Court’s shift away from the categorical speech model that treats 
commercial speech as of lesser import, though it did not announce a doctrinal 
departure from settled case law. 
Sorrell concerned a challenge to Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Law, 
designed to prohibit health insurers from selling, licensing, or exchanging 
“prescriber-identifiable information . . . for marketing or promoting a prescription 
drug” unless the prescribing doctor so consented.38  Vermont passed the law in 
 
presents unique regulatory difficulties because it is not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
 33. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993).  
 34. Id. at 774 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).  
 35. Id. at 775–76.  
 36. See Part I.D, infra.  
 37. See, e.g., Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Appelsmith, 810 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2016).  The Ninth 
Circuit read Sorrell as requiring heightened scrutiny when evaluating “content-based restrictions on non-
misleading commercial speech,” a departure from Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny.  Id. at 642.  
The panel, however, was reversed in a hearing en banc.  See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 
F.3d 839 (9th Cir. 2017).  
 38. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 558 (2011).  
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response to a growing concern that pharmacies with access to patient prescribing 
information were selling this data to pharmaceutical marketers who would then target 
doctors.39  Although data mining companies claimed that the law’s treatment of 
prescriber data infringed upon their First Amendment rights, the legislature defended 
the regulation as a means to protect patient and doctor privacy and to reduce drug 
costs.  Crucially, the law did not prohibit marketers from advertising at all.  Rather, 
it sought to limit access to certain forms of information that marketers would rely on 
to make their advertisements more efficient without a doctor opting in to the system.  
The law did, however, permit patient collected data to be distributed to universities 
for research purposes and to insurance companies. 
In their petition for certiorari, the state of Vermont broadened the scope of the 
legal issues to include the “burgeoning business” of “commercial data-mining.”40  
The State framed the issue as one involving a law protecting and limiting access to 
non-public personal information, and argued that the First Amendment does not give 
license to data-mining companies accessing such private information.41 
By contrast, the data-mining companies and advertisers highlighted the perceived 
restrictions on their ability to engage in commercial speech.  Accordingly, the State 
was engaged in viewpoint discrimination by hampering their ability to communicate 
with prescribing doctors, while allowing the information to “be purchased or 
acquired by other speakers with diverse purposes and viewpoints.”42  The 
respondents were joined by a host of amici including representatives of the 
advertising industry who wrote to defend the use of data in modern advertising. 
Ultimately, the Court glossed over the technological intricacies of data collection, 
instead finding both content- and viewpoint-based restrictions and subjecting the law 
to strict scrutiny.43  As it determined the statute was deficient under both intermediate 
and heightened scrutiny, the Court did not rely on a Central Hudson analysis.  Some 
commentators attributed this sidestep to the Court’s traditional hesitancy to wade 
heavily into emerging areas of technology that may become outdated and to avoid 
fixing constitutional doctrine on such an unsteady foundation.44 
As to whether data is speech, the Court broadly announced that “[t]he creation 
and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First 
 
 39. Id. at 576 (citing Vermont’s legislative findings regarding the Patient Confidentiality Law).  
The legislature expressed concern that these marketing campaigns encouraged doctors to prescribe brand-
name drugs that were more expensive than generics and that, based on an incomplete patient profile, might 
be less safe for patients. 
 40. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2007) (No. 10-
779). 
 41. Brief for the Petitioner at 26, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2007) (No. 10-779) 
(“The commercial use of nonpublic information is better described as commercial conduct than 
commercial speech.”)  Further, the opt-in mechanism preserved a doctor’s ability to consent such that the 
law did not function as a blanket restriction prohibiting any dissemination to data-mining companies. 
 42. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added).  
 43. Having read the law to impose both content and viewpoint discrimination, the Court concluded 
“there is no need to determine whether all speech hampered by § 4631(d) is commercial.”  Id. at 571.  
 44. Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: How Broad is the Right to Mine Data, SCOTUSBlog (Apr. 
22, 2011, 4:49 PM), http://perma.cc/MR64-BVF8. 
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Amendment.”45  However, Justice Kennedy relied on three cases in support of this 
proposition—Bartnicki v. Vopper, Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., and Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.—none of which speak directly to how 
the data was used in Sorrell, nor how data is used in targeted advertisements.  
Ultimately, these three cases do not provide any clear bases on which lower courts 
could distinguish between data that receives full First Amendment protection and 
that which is only used in commercial purposes. 
First, the Court principally relied upon Bartnicki v. Vopper for the proposition that 
transfers of information fall within the protections afforded by the First 
Amendment.46  Bartnicki overturned provisions of a wiretap act that prohibited the 
disclosure of illegally intercepted communications.  The Court held that “privacy 
concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public 
importance.”47  However, communications involving discussions with a teacher’s 
union during collective bargaining negotiations has a different flavor of privacy than 
medical data—or even data used for personalized advertising—based on the former’s 
nexus to a matter of public concern.  As it neither directly nor indirectly touches on 
the commercial speech doctrine, Bartnicki is better grouped with New York Times v. 
Sullivan and the First Amendment’s commitment to disseminating and removing 
obstacles to distribution of matters of public importance.48 
Second, the Court relied on Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 
a defamation suit involving false statements in a credit report.49  The Court, applying 
Gertz v. Robert Welch and New York Times v. Sullivan, held that the assertions in the 
credit report were not matters of public concern.  The Court in Dun & Bradstreet 
found that the speech at issue, while “not totally unprotected by the First 
Amendment,” enjoyed “less stringent” protections, in part because the credit report 
“concern[ed] no public issue,” and was demonstrably false and damaging.50  While 
the plurality held a “credit report is ‘speech,’”51 it did not find that credit reporting is 
commercial speech, despite requesting supplemental briefing on the issue.52  Dun & 
Bradstreet stands for the proposition that privacy interests weigh more heavily in the 
context of private business interest rather than traditional public issue speech. 
 
 45. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 516 (2001).  
 48. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
 49. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570.  
 50. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760–62 (1985) (plurality 
opinion).  
 51. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570.  
 52. See Richard L. Barnes, A Call for a Value-Based Test of Commercial Speech, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 
649, 688–92 (1985).  Barnes walks through the arguments in favor and against finding that credit reports 
fall within commercial speech definition.  The Court ultimately did not decide the case on this issue, 
applying Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) instead to classify the information contained 
in the reports as private speech.  Barnes faults the Court for failing to capitalize on an “opportunity to 
synthesize the newly created private speech category with the commercial speech doctrine”.  
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Third, the Court cited Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. to find that information on 
labels qualifies as speech.53  Rubin invalidated a provision banning beer companies 
from displaying the alcohol content on labels.  The law was intended to prevent 
“strength wars” between competing brewers, a tap from which deleterious 
consequences might readily flow.54  The Court defended its holding on the basis of 
removing impediments to increase consumer access to information.55  However, its 
relevance to the facts of Sorrell is quite limited, since Rubin did not address the 
privacy concerns raised in Sorrell.56 
The few words spent on data specifically may actually prove a boon to those 
seeking to find a legally sufficient way to enact privacy legislation.57  Indeed, the 
majority’s ending remarks acknowledge the narrow grounds on which Sorrell was 
decided, and just how much is left to be resolved regarding data mining:  “The 
capacity of technology to find and publish personal information, including records 
required by the government, presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to 
personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure.”58  The opinion provides only the 
barest advice for future regulators, with the majority stating, “In considering how to 
protect those interests . . . the State cannot engage in content-based discrimination to 
advance its own side of a debate.”59  Vermont had gone too far. 
Though the dissent only garnered three votes, it highlights the doctrinal clash 
between a growing First Amendment jurisprudence friendly to commercial speakers 
and the scores of economic regulations that will incidentally touch on speech.  Justice 
Breyer’s dissent described the Vermont law as one “related to a lawful governmental 
effort to regulate a commercial enterprise.”60  For this reason, there was no need to 
scrutinize the statute under the First Amendment.61  Justice Breyer, joined by Justices 
Ginsburg and Kagan, took issue with the majority’s opening “a Pandora’s Box of 
First Amendment challenges to many ordinary regulatory practices that may only 
incidentally affect a commercial message.”62  The dissent also noted that the 
majority’s categorization of the restriction as either “content-based” or “speaker-
based” had never “before justified greater scrutiny when regulatory activity 
 
 53. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570 (citing Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.) (“Both parties agree that the 
information on beer labels constitutes commercial speech.”). 
 54. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 479 (1995).  
 55. Id. at 484.  
 56. In an overview of its commercial speech doctrine, the Court emphasized “the free flow of 
commercial information is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system 
because it informs the numerous private decisions that drive the system.”  Id. at 481 (citing Virginia Bd. 
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)). 
 57. See Agatha M. Cole, Note, Internet Advertising After Sorrell v. IMS Health:  A Discussion on 
Data Privacy & the First Amendment, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283, 285 (2012).  
 58. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 579. 
 59. Id. at 579–80.  
 60. Id. at 580–81(Breyer, J. dissenting).  
 61. Id. at 602 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The speech-related consequences here are indirect, 
incidental, and entirely commercial.”). 
 62. Breyer further invoked Lochner, concerned that the majority was getting close to “substituting 
judicial for democratic decision-making where ordinary economic regulation is at issue.”  Id. at 602–03 
(Breyer, J. dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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affect[ed] commercial speech.”63  The split within the Court reveals the disagreement 
between those justices ready to extend more First Amendment protections to all 
speakers—removing the artificial divide between commercial and non-commercial 
speech—and those who would view such a move as upending much of the current 
regulation on commerce. 
C. APPROACHES TO COMMERCIAL SPEECH CASES POST-SORRELL 
Following Sorrell, the conclusion is that Central Hudson remains untouched as 
the lodestar of commercial speech analysis.  An alternative reading of Sorrell 
suggests a shift in the Court’s jurisprudence that seeks to provide further 
constitutional protections to commercial speakers.64  As support, the Court alluded 
to the viability of Commercial Speech Doctrine in Matal v. Tam, decided in 2016, 
where it held that the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act violated the First 
Amendment.65  As in Sorrell, the majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence centered on the untenable viewpoint discrimination ensconced in the 
Trademark Act.66  Having identified viewpoint discrimination, the Court could 
dispose of the case without reaching commercial speech issues.67 
Both Justice Alito, writing for the majority, and Justice Kennedy intimated that 
the challenges in defining commercial speech can limit the applicability of an 
intermediate scrutiny analysis.  Both Justices endorsed tightening the prongs of 
Central Hudson in order to squeeze out what has formerly been treated as 
commercial speech.68  In this way, an intermediate scrutiny standard can be 
manipulated to be functionally equivalent to a strict scrutiny analysis.69  The Court 
has implicitly laid the foundation for eradicating the categorical carve-out accorded 
to commercial speech.70  Uncertainty over the reach of commercial speech permits 
classifying speech on the margin as non-commercial.71  Further, fear of failing to 
 
 63. Id. at 588 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 64. David H. Gans, Sorrell v. IMS Health:  Corporate Commercial Speech in the Age of Citizens 
United, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR. (June 24, 2011), https://perma.cc/USS5-J825. 
 65. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). 
 66. Id. at 1768 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“To permit 
viewpoint discrimination in this context is to permit Government censorship.”).  
 67. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence bypasses any application of Central Hudson.  Finding that the 
disparagement clause presented an irreconcilable instance of viewpoint discrimination, the Court applied 
heightened scrutiny.  Id. at 1767.  
 68. Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I continue to 
believe that when the government seeks to restrict truthful speech in order to suppress the ideas it conveys, 
strict scrutiny is appropriate, whether or not the speech in question may be characterized as 
‘commercial.’”).  
 69. Redish & Voils, supra note 21, at 774 (“Indeed, it seems that, in almost all facets, the Court 
now affords truthful commercial speech virtually as much First Amendment protection as it does 
noncommercial speech.”).  
 70. Commentators have questioned whether there still exists any wiggle room between the “Court’s 
modern view of Central Hudson,” which employs a stringent narrow tailoring articulation, and strict 
scrutiny.  See Case Comment, Matal v. Tam, 131 HARV. L. REV. 243, 250–51 (2017).  
 71. “If affixing the commercial label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to 
political or social “volatility,” free speech would be endangered.”  Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1765.  
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protect speech against government encroachment doctrinally presumes deregulation 
is the preferable course.  The implication is that, should such an approach continue 
to garner a minimum of five votes, the Court will downplay the concerns of Justices 
Breyer, Kagan, and Ginsburg regarding the continued viability of economic 
regulations that implicate—however tangentially—speech interests.72  Post-Matal, 
regulations of commercial speech seeking to withstand the current Court’s searching 
scrutiny must thread a very thin needle. 
However, seven years after the Court handed down the Sorrell decision, circuit 
courts continue to apply Central Hudson, despite the Court’s application of 
“heightened scrutiny.”73  Some circuits have read Sorrell as tacking on a predicate 
inquiry prior to applying Central Hudson, whereby the Court must first determine 
whether the restriction is content or speaker based.74  But regardless of this “two 
step,” the Central Hudson framework remains viable provided that challenged 
regulations do not fatally engage in viewpoint discrimination.75 
D. SPEECH FOR WHOSE BENEFIT, THE SPEAKER OR THE LISTENER? 
The bulk of First Amendment jurisprudence derives from the importance of 
protecting the interests of the speaker.  Commercial speech, by contrast, takes the 
perspective of the listener into account.  Early on, the Court vindicated “the particular 
consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information,” and struck 
regulations it deemed too paternalistic.76  Motivated by the premise that a listener 
ought to have access to necessary and factual information that would enable 
autonomous decisions,77 the Court blessed regulations that policed false and 
 
 72. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. 552 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 
2234–35 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (articulating a series of instances where “speech 
regulated by government . . . inevitably involves[s] content discrimination, but where a strong presumption 
against constitutionality has no place” including, inter alia, regulation of securities, prescription drugs, 
income tax statements, and signs at petting zoos).  
 73. See Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 841 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Sorrell did not 
modify the Central Hudson standard.”); Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th 
Cir. 2017); 1-800-411-Pain Referral Serv., LLC v. Otto, 744 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2014); Educ. Media Co. 
at Virginia Tech v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 
2012).  
 74. Ocheesee Creamery, 851 F.3d at 1235 n.7; see also Caronia, 703 F.3d at 163–64 (“Sorrell 
engaged in a two-step inquiry.” (internal citations omitted)).  
 75. At the district level, see Vugo, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 273 F. Supp. 3d 910, 916 (N.D. Ill. 
2017) (“[W]hile the Court applied “heightened” scrutiny to the commercial speech restrictions in Sorrell, 
it is far from clear that this standard differed from the one Central Hudson requires.”). 
 76. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 431–32 (1993) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring) (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 763 (1976)).  
 77. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“I think 
the right to receive publications is such a fundamental right.  The dissemination of ideas can accomplish 
nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider them.  It would be a barren 
marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers.”).  
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deceptive commercial information.78  In his concurrence in City of Cincinnati v. 
Discovery Network, Inc., Justice Blackmun derived the “lesser protection” for 
commercial speech from “the listener’s First Amendment interests.”79 
Per the Court’s initial conceit, commercial speech should be accorded fewer 
constitutional protections because the speaker does not enjoy the same dignitary and 
democratic interests that flow from other modes of First Amendment speech or 
conduct.  Commercial speech, unlike non-commercial, is objectifiable, and the 
veracity of the speech can be deduced.  Because a profit motive renders it “hardy,” 
commercial speech requires fewer constitutional protections.80  Professor Robert 
Post opined that commercial speech is accorded some protections, not because it 
permits the speaker and listener alike to engage in “democratic legitimacy,” but 
merely because it facilitates an informational exchange.81  Per Post, the Supreme 
Court has established a legal taxonomy that privileges “public discourse” among 
First Amendment values.82  Chief among the First Amendment purposes is 
safeguarding the ability of citizens to criticize robustly the state and to remove 
impediments to such discourse.  Commercial speech, in this model, does not advance 
a democratic system so regulations of it are less troubling. 
The opposing view argues that, even in the absence of strong speaker interests, 
commercial speech should not be denied the full panoply of constitutional 
protections.83  In advocating for the leveling up of constitutional protections for 
commercial speakers, Professor Martin Redish questions depressing the level of 
scrutiny based purely on a speaker’s “self-interest, economic or otherwise.”84  
Professor Redish theorizes that, for no other reason than an “ideologically driven 
desire to penalize those who benefit from the capitalistic system,” jurisprudence 
singles out commercial speech.85 
 
 78. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 432 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Bates v. State Bar 
of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977)) (“A listener has little interest in receiving false, misleading, or 
deceptive commercial information.”).  
 79. Id. at 434 (Blackmun, J. concurring).  
 80. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 
(1976).  
 81. Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. 
L. REV. 2353, 2371–72 (2000). 
 82. See also Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (internal citations omitted) (“Our 
jurisprudence has emphasized that commercial speech enjoys a limited measure of protection, 
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.”).  
 83. See, e.g., Nat Stern & Mark Joseph Stern, Advancing an Adaptive Standard of Strict Scrutiny 
for Content-Based Commercial Speech Regulation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (2013) (arguing that 
strict scrutiny would provide a “more coherent approach than Central Hudson’s oft-criticized multi-
pronged test” and would ensure that commercial speech is no longer seen as the “doctrinal stepchild” in 
First Amendment jurisprudence); Martin Redish, Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 
CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, No. 813 (June 19, 2017) (praising the Court’s trend “to extend commercial 
speech protection to the point that it is rapidly approaching a level of constitutional insulation”), 
https://perma.cc/P7HB-YHRH.  
 84. Redish, supra note 83, at 11.  
 85. Id. (emphasis added).  
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Professor Redish defends the “catalytic role that the corporate form plays in 
fostering individual self-realization.”86  As support, he locates the corporate form in 
Jacksonian democratic theory, which allowed the American everyman to limit his 
liability to compete on a wider stage.  Commercial speech is not devoid of value 
simply because it is bound up in economics.  Nor should the status of a speaker as a 
participant in commerce somehow result in his enjoying fewer protections.  A formal 
conception of commercial speech inextricable from profit maximization glosses over 
the nuances otherwise present in First Amendment analysis.  Further, such an 
approach ignores the permeability between commercial and non-commercial speech 
in practice. 
In the last four decades, the Court has gradually dialed up the protections accorded 
to commercial speakers.  In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, the Court focused on 
the interest of speakers—tobacco retailers and manufacturers—in “conveying 
truthful information about their products.”87  Commentators have noted this trend of 
commercial speakers toward reframing challenges to regulations under First 
Amendment cover.88  Professor Frederick Schauer has termed this strategy, “First 
Amendment opportunism.”89  Tilting its hand toward speakers, the Court has 
toughened the Central Hudson prongs and raised the bar for the government to clear. 
Ultimately, however, neither Post’s nor Redish’s frameworks of the Commercial 
Speech Doctrine maps in a satisfactory way onto the modern framework of targeted 
advertising—where the listener serves as a predicate provider of data to the speaker, 
in some instances without the listener’s knowledge.  Here, the interests of the listener 
and speaker may be at odds without a satisfactory approach to reconciling this 
divergence.  Further, to the extent commercial speech contemplates two discrete 
parties, it is inadequate to fit in the role of the service provider that connects the 
speaker and listener—but is itself motivated by commercial interests as well. 
II. DATA COLLECTION 
This Part details methods of data collection and transmission in the Internet 
Information Economy.  Such platforms present unique challenges to regulators and 
to the First Amendment given that the commercial activity of these innovative 
platforms fully implicate the listener.  The targeted advertising scheme contemplates 
three players: the user, the advertiser, and the social media platform—a data 
repository that can package user data into valuable “dossiers.”90  First, information—
specifically, user-inputted data—is valuable currency for sites such as Facebook and 
 
 86. Id. at 7.  
 87. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001). 
 88. See Jeremy K. Kessler, First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 2002 (2016). 
 89. Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism (John F. Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard University, KSG Working Paper No. 00-011, Aug. 2000), https://perma.cc/J46Z-4PME.  Schauer 
posits that, following the New Deal, economic libertarians have abandoned lodging arguments based on 
incursions to economic liberty and now are much more inclined to challenge regulations on a First 
Amendment basis.  For Schauer, the “First Amendment is the authority of choice when no authority is on 
point.”  
 90. See Bernstein & Lee, supra note 26, at 64–65.  
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LinkedIn.91  The collection and transmission of data, insofar as data may be imbued 
with speech properties, functions as a structural obstacle to effective regulation.  
Second, these companies jettison the traditional framework for monetizing services.  
Rather than charge users access fees, the new model instead leverages user data to 
sustain the service.  Given the first postulate that data has value, a conceptual “swap” 
of money for data is structurally coherent even if the user does not realize the implicit 
“cost.”92  While new and social media do increase consumer welfare, that is not to 
the exclusion of their own financial interests.93  Provided users continue to generate 
content, there is no likely natural end to the proliferation of targeted advertisements. 
A. TYPES OF DATA COLLECTED 
Advertising algorithms parse particular traits to match with data collected and 
transmitted via new and social media platforms.  In short, every key stroke, comment, 
and disclosure of data functions as an “ad targeting attribute.”94  Over time, with 
repeated user inputs and increasingly specific audience parameters, targeting can 
become “more fine grained.”95  Demographic indicia enables an advertiser to collate, 
among other things, a user’s gender, income, employment, age;96 geographic data 
reveals a user’s location; behavioral data analyzes a user’s browsing activity.  
According to Facebook’s Ad Manager platform, an interested marketer can tailor ads 
by selecting the relevant indicia from a score of potential data points.97 
Additionally, Facebook and Instagram now allow advertisers to rely on 
“Personally Identifiable Information,” which includes the user’s name, email 
 
 91. Facebook Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/93SG-HYX8.  “In 
2017, we continued to focus on our three main revenue growth priorities: . . .  (ii) developing innovative 
ad products that help businesses get the most of their ad campaigns, and (iii) making our ads more relevant 
and effective through our targeting capabilities and outcome-based measurement.”  
 92. A user may be lulled into complacency when there is no hit to his wallet or may be led to 
attribute misplaced goodwill to companies who appear to generously donate their services. 
 93. Redish, supra note 83, emphasizes that a commercial nexus or co-motivation should not serve 
as grounds on which to deprive particular rights.  
 94. VICE News, Everything You Need to Know About the Hidden Ways Facebook Ads Target You, 
YOUTUBE (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EM1IM2QUYjk. 
 95. Id. (citing G. Venkatadri et al., Privacy Risks with Facebook’s PII-based Targeting:  Auditing 
a Data Broker’s Advertising Interface, https://perma.cc/B7LN-387F). 
 96. For a time, advertisers on Facebook’s platform had the option to select such attributes as anti-
Semitic when crafting their audience.  Following reporting by ProPublica, Facebook removed those 
categories, defending their existence as created by an algorithm and acknowledging the need for increased 
human monitoring.  Id. 
 97. Facebook Business, Choose Your Audience, https://perma.cc/LW9P-L7ZQ (last visited Feb. 
21, 2018).  Advertisers are precluded from explicitly tailoring along racial or ethnic lines.  Despite this 
ostensible prohibition, advertisers have discovered a workaround that achieves roughly the same goal – 
targeting based on “affinity” or “interest,” whereby advertisers select interest categories that are 
predominately associated with one race.  Id.  See also J. Angwin et al., Facebook (Still) Letting Housing 
Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://perma.cc/3ZC2-
GTT9. 
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address, and phone number.98  So doing, advertisers can harness offline data 
requiring no user input or activity.99 
B. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
The following two sections survey data collection and transmission within the 
Internet Information Economy before focusing on Facebook’s particular methods.100  
Online data collection for use in targeted advertising relies on proxies, drawing on a 
user’s history and expressed preferences to deduce the most relevant 
advertisements.101  Typically, such collection is via cookie installation on a user’s 
Internet browser.102  Cookies are small text files that a website places on the 
computer of any visitor to that site.103  Their data gathering capacity ranges based on 
tracking duration and the quantity and quality of data collected.104  The entity 
 
 98. G. Venkatadri et al., Privacy Risks with Facebook’s PII-based Targeting:  Auditing a Data 
Broker’s Advertising Interface, tbl. 1, https://perma.cc/B7LN-387F. 
 99. Id. at 1.  See also VICE News, Everything You Need to Know About the Hidden Ways Facebook 
Ads Target You, YOUTUBE (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EM1IM2QUYjk.  
 100. Facebook makes for an appropriate case study given its market share within the Internet 
Information Economy and its business model.  In April 2018, Facebook enjoyed a market value of roughly 
$481 billion. VICE News, Everything You Need to Know About the Hidden Ways Facebook Ads Target 
You, YOUTUBE (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EM1IM2QUYjk.  After the release 
of its second quarter earnings in July 2018, Facebook suffered the largest fall in market capitalization in 
history—plummeting $119 billion in a single day.  Fred Imbert & Gina Francolla, Facebook’s $100 
billion-plus Route is the Biggest Loss in Stock Market History, CNBC (July 26, 2018, 12:41 AM), 
https://perma.cc/Q3TQ-X7S4.  As of the time of publication, that value has recovered to $470 billion.  
Facebook, Inc. Class A Common Stock (FB) Quote & Summary Data, NASDAQ, 
https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/fb (last updated Sept. 8, 2018).  
 101. Darla Cameron, How Targeted Advertising Works, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/M9QR-LNEH.  
 102. Sites may also install web beacons or flash cookies to assist in better tracking and collection. 
Web beacons assist advertisers in identifying whether their ad placed on another site appears.  Joanna 
Geary, Tracking the trackers:  What Are Cookies? An Introduction to Web Tracking, GUARDIAN (UK) 
(Apr. 23, 2012), https://perma.cc/F74M-C83P.  In response to attempts to attach cookies, a user can set 
up an alert system.  See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Online Tracking, CONSUMER INFO., https://perma.cc/Q4AV-
HCYR (last visited Jan. 9, 2018). 
 103. Internet Cookies, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://perma.cc/LA8S-ALFB (last visited Nov. 17, 
2017).  
 104. ‘Single-session’ cookies assist in navigation while a user remains on the site and will only 
store information until the user exits the page.  See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Online Tracking, CONSUMER 
INFO., https://perma.cc/7XB4-Y4XL (last visited Jan. 9, 2018).  Session cookies allow a user to keep track 
of items in an online shopping basket; to permit the user to submit complaints or fill out a survey; or to 
allow ease of navigation.  Internet Cookies, supra note 103; see also Rodica Tirtea et al., Bittersweet 
Cookies: Some Security and Privacy Considerations, ENISA, https://perma.cc/2D3K-77XB.  As such, 
single-session cookies do not pose many consumer privacy concerns.  See John Barnes, Internet User’s 
Privacy Concerns May Mean Cookies Start to Crumble, GUARDIAN (UK) (May 24, 2013, 9:48 AM), 
https://perma.cc/VM53-WZHR (“But the internet simply would not work without cookies—they are a 
fundamental currency of the internet, enabling web analytics as well as tailoring the online experience, 
compiling a browsing history and the rest.”).  ‘Permanent’ cookies attach to a user’s hard drive and follow 
the user to subsequent visits to other sites. Scientific American, Use of Cookies, https://perma.cc/HC9B-
XF9Y (last visited Jan. 9, 2018).  An additional distinction is between ‘first party’ and ‘third party’ 
cookies.  First-party cookies are placed by the website that a user is currently visiting.  Online Tracking, 
supra note 102.  By contrast, a third-party cookie is placed by a different domain than the website the user 
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responsible for placing that cookie can then construct a history and profile around 
the user for effective targeting.105 
Cookies, however, are not compatible with mobile devices, forcing advertisers to 
adapt their data collection and transmission mechanisms.  Computers, particularly 
household computers, are often shared, diminishing the effectiveness of targeted 
ads.106  By contrast, mobile trackers rely primarily on unique “device identifiers” that 
allow advertisers to follow a user’s unique code, thereby solving an inherent 
verification problem with cookie usage.107  In exchange for more personalized 
advertisements that appear on a mobile device, the consumer is exposed to more 
intrusive tracking.108 
Access to Facebook and the site’s ability to amass data is predicated on a user 
disclosing personal information, which is aggregated for future advertising matches.  
Initially, Facebook supplemented the data keyed into its site by partnering with third-
party websites to obtain user browsing history.109  Data-mining firms that amass user 
data based on cookies, information gathered from government records surveys, and 
private sources110 can match their user profile to the Facebook generated profile.  
This maps into a robust profile of any user.111  As of the time of publication, 
Facebook has announced that it will cease integrating with third party data brokers.112  
Although Facebook will no longer serve as the junction receiving input from both 
the data broker and the advertiser, nothing precludes the data broker from rerouting 
the data to feed the advertiser directly for advertisements that will be curated for and 
displayed to Facebook users.113 
 
is on, which can include an Internet Information Economy platform, and functions largely as a tracker 
device.  Id.  The collected information is relayed automatically to the domain that placed the cookie the 
social media site.  Support, Disable Third-party Cookies in Firefox to Stop Some Types of Tracking by 
Advertisers, MOZILLA, https://perma.cc/XJF2-82YH (last visited Jan. 9, 2018).  
 105. Google uses permanent cookies to measure user’s activity on a site.  Per a study presented at 
the Federal Trade Commissions’ “PrivacyCon” in 2016, Google and Facebook topped the list of entities 
with the greatest potential for online tracking.  Ibrahim Altaweel et al., Web Privacy Census v3.0, TECH. 
SCI. (Dec. 2015), https://perma.cc/WD9W-ADHK. 
 106. At the same time, most advertisers are aware of how appendage-like smart-phone devices have 
become.  Failing to capture the market segment of those who spend a vast majority of their Internet 
browsing time online via their phone as opposed to on a computer would represent a significant value loss.  
 107. Donna Hong, 5 Reasons Why Mobile Device ID Tracking is the Future of Marketing, BRIDGE 
(Oct. 6, 2016), https://perma.cc/J5W4-EC9G.  
 108. Id.  (“The mobile device ID is a powerful piece of information because it’s a window into the 
most used device by consumers.  Gaining insight into how they are spending their time on mobile (app 
downloads, app usage, etc.) is extremely valuable to understanding their interests, media preferences, and 
consumer behaviors.”).  
 109. Dewey, supra note 10.  
 110. Kashmir Hill, Facebook Joins Forces with Data Brokers to Gather More Intel About Users for 
Ads, FORBES (Feb. 27, 2013, 3:11 PM), https://perma.cc/8F6V-QXAS.  
 111. What is Your Facebook Data Worth?, REUTERS (June 21, 2010), https://perma.cc/3BQU-9TU7.  
 112. VICE News, Everything You Need to Know About the Hidden Ways Facebook Ads Target You, 
YOUTUBE (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EM1IM2QUYjk.  
 113. Id.  
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C. METHODS OF DATA TRANSMISSION 
Broadly speaking, advertisements reach consumers via an intermediary auction 
platform.114  Data is sold to advertisers and ad-networks through an auction either by 
contracting directly with websites or with Internet Service Providers (ISPs).115  
Facebook and Google each host their own auction, where the winner proposes the 
most relevant advertisement, not the highest bid.116  Recently, Facebook and Google 
rolled out the “Custom Audience” feature to their respective advertising interfaces.  
An advertiser uploads “Personally Identifying Information” about a user that the 
advertiser desires to target specifically.  This powerful targeting system inverts the 
traditional model by enabling the advertiser to select specific users ex ante, as 
opposed to drilling down by attributes.117  Across all methods of data collection, the 
underlying concern remains the relative lack of transparency about the process of 
reaching the consumer.118 
III. CONCEPTUALIZING DATA COLLECTION AND TRANSMISSION 
WITHIN CURRENT COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
The paucity of claims challenging data collection and transmission is commonly 
attributed to the claim that consumers willingly give up their data in a rational cost-
benefit exchange.119  However, a 2015 study conducted by the Annenberg School for 
Communication at the University of Pennsylvania found that consumers’ furnishing 
of their data may be explained by (i) a sense of resignation about the inevitability of 
 
 114. For a particularly helpful summation of the structure of these intermediary ad exchanges, see 
Shuai Yuan et al., Real Time Bidding for Online Advertising: Measurement and Analysis, ADKDD 2013, 
https://perma.cc/C9SM-8FWR.  It is projected that over half of all online ads will be sold via RTB by 
2018. Special Report, Buy, Buy, Baby, ECONOMIST (Sept. 13, 2014), https://perma.cc/6DVH-JL98. 
 115. Vincent Toubiana et al., Adnostic: Privacy Preserving Targeted Advertising, PROCEEDINGS 
NETWORK & DISTRIBUTED SYS. SYMP., Mar. 2010, at 3, available at https://perma.cc/3BP3-YKEU.  
 116. Facebook Business, About the Delivery System: Ad Auctions, FACEBOOK,  
https://perma.cc/J9HN-RW2D (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); see also Cade Metz, How Facebook’s Ad 
System Works, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/technology/how-
facebook-ads-work.html.  Metz’ article describes the blurring between advertisement and ‘content’ that 
appears on a Facebook user’s page.  Facebook’s auction algorithm is responsible for handling both 
advertisements and organic content.  
 117. G. Venkatadri et al., supra note 98.  Venkatadri and his co-contributors’ scholarship focuses on 
the privacy implications of relying on “Personally Identifiable Information” (“PII”).  Their work describes 
how information about a user can be de-anonymized and identifies a spreading effect whereby knowledge 
of a user’s email address alone can be harnessed to reveal further personal information.  
 118. The most extreme version of this precise targeting manifested in ‘dark posts’ or unpublished 
posts whose viewership is controlled by the author but are otherwise unsearchable.  Id.  See also Pierre 
Omidyar, 6 Ways Social Media Has Become a Direct Threat to Democracy, 35 NPQ 42 (Jan. 2018), 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/npqu.12123 (explaining how dark posts were used in the 
2016 Presidential election).  Facebook has since announced the end of dark posts, in a shift towards greater 
transparency. Garett Sloane, No More ‘Dark Posts’:  Facebook to Reveal All Ads, ADAGE (Oct. 27, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/46DA-BQGA.   
 119. Joseph Turow, Michael Hennessy & Nora Draper, supra note 3, at 7 (“Marketers enthuse over 
the idea that people’s acceptance of the general idea of tradeoffs justifies marketers’ collection of enough 
data points about consumers to lead to the kind of personalization Yahoo calls the pathway to advertising 
nirvana”) (internal citations omitted).  
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data collection and (ii) ignorance of the ways in which digital commerce operates 
and where the current legal regime fails to protect their interests.120  The growth of 
personalized solicitations has eroded the democratizing effects of an open 
marketplace and undermined consumer autonomy.121  The Annenberg study 
indicates that consumers are not receiving the types of information that Commercial 
Speech Doctrine seeks to guarantee.122 
This Part weighs legal arguments in favor of increasing and decreasing protections 
for targeted advertising.  Considering the philosophical underpinnings of commercial 
speech and lower courts’ recent treatment of related cases, qualified constitutional 
protection best vindicates listener interests in data privacy and usage, and receipt of 
accurate information.  Subjecting regulations to this tier of scrutiny addresses the 
current legal interstices and ensures informed consumer consent when furnishing 
data within the Internet Information Economy. 
A. ADVERTISING INDUSTRY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF “LEVELED-UP” SPEECH 
PROTECTIONS 
An oft-cited justification for increased constitutional protections is the challenge 
in adequately distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial speech.123  
The advertising industry, joined by libertarian scholars, contends “[t]he First 
Amendment safeguards the entire communication process, including the gathering 
of data used to create a commercial or non-commercial message.”124  Narrowly 
defined commercial speech should capture only speech explicitly proposing a 
commercial transaction; speech outside of that scope is entitled to the full panoply of 
First Amendment protection.125  The Supreme Court has been sympathetic to 
positing that ex ante raw user data does not “propose a commercial transaction.”126  
Even applying Central Hudson’s broader definition of commercial speech, data that 
 
 120. Id. at 8–9.  
 121. Id. at 19.  Among the reported findings, the survey revealed fundamental misconceptions 
surrounding consumer choice.  The survey highlights the existence of “tailored offers” which may not 
reflect the best price or option depending on a consumer’s particular demographics.  
 122. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–67 
(1982) (op. of Brennan, J.) (“We have held that in a variety of contexts ‘the Constitution protects the right 
to receive information and ideas.’”) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).  In the 
commercial context, the audience’s right to receive information exists as a predominant right, not one that 
is solely derived from the speaker’s right to engage in commercial speech.  The emphasis, thus, must 
always be on the audience and in ensuring that the audience receives factually true and not misleading 
information.  
 123. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 657 (2003).  
 124. Brief for Nat’l Advertisers, Inc., American Advertising Fed. & American Ass’n of Advertising 
Agencies as Amici Curaie Supporting Respondents at 6, Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) 
(No. 10-779) (emphasis added).  See also Bambauer, supra note 25, at 63.  Professor Bambauer argues 
“in every context relevant to the current debates in information law, data is speech.  Privacy regulations 
are rarely incidental burdens to knowledge.  Instead, they are deliberately designed to disrupt knowledge 
creation.”  
 125. Brief for Nat’l Advertisers, supra note 124, at 7.  
 126. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 776, 777 
(1976).  
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is in one form used for targeted advertising could have decidedly non-economic uses 
as well.  For this reason, labeling data as commercial speech is under-inclusive. 
Advertisers claim that regulations that render the targeted message less 
‘individualized’ represent an untenable violation of the First Amendment.  The Tenth 
Circuit has held that “a restriction on speech tailored to a particular audience, 
‘targeted speech,’ cannot be cured simply by the fact that a speaker can speak to a 
larger indiscriminate audience.”127  The court found impermissible restrictions on an 
advertiser’s ability to reach its desired audience by prohibiting the use of personal 
information to target consumers.  However, no other circuits have expressly adopted 
the Tenth Circuit’s stance on restrictions to targeted advertising as constituting de 
facto impermissible burdens, and the D.C. Circuit has distinguished its approach to 
weighing regulatory interests under Central Hudson.128 
A generous reading in favor of “leveling up” constitutional protections for 
consumer data draws strength from the interests of the speaker.  Internet Information 
Economy platforms argue that such data practices are not merely economic but are 
imbued with other speech properties and concomitant constitutional protections.  The 
counter position does not deny that the ultimate commercial message is not deserving 
of First Amendment protections.  Rather, as Professor Neil Richards prophesizes, 
finding data to be speech would result in “every restriction on the disclosure—not to 
mention the collection or use—of information [facing] heightened First Amendment 
scrutiny.”129  Although the advertising industry and advocates for increased speech 
 
 127. U.S. W., Inc. v. F.C.C., 182 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999).  U.S. West challenged the FCC’s 
regulation obligating telecommunications companies to obtain consent prior to the companies’ using 
“customer proprietary network information” (CPNI) in marketing initiatives.  In applying a Central 
Hudson analysis, the Court narrowly read the government’s asserted privacy right as avoiding “undue 
embarrassment or ridicule” as a result of disseminating private information, ultimately finding this was 
not sufficient.  Id. at 1235.  Although the regulations did not cover the substance of what a company could 
say to its customers or limit the breadth of such messaging, the Tenth Circuit, in applying Central Hudson 
found the regulations impermissible “restrictions on speech.”  In determining what was commercial 
speech, the Court included not only the marketing to the consumers, but also “intra-carrier” speech based 
on CPNI as “integral to and inseparable from the ultimate commercial solicitation.”  Id. at 1233 n.4.  
 128. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. F.C.C., 555 F.3d 996, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[W]e 
do not share the Tenth Circuit’s doubt.  For one thing, we have already held, in an analogous context, that 
“protecting the privacy of consumer credit information” is a “substantial” governmental interest, as 
Central Hudson uses the term); Individual Reference Servs. Grp. v. F.T.C., 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 42 (D.D.C. 
2001); Trans Union LLC v. F.T.C., 295 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (distinguishing U.S. West as lacking a 
“satisfactorily articulated” concept of privacy).  
 129. Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1501, 1522 (2015).  Though the Court in Sorrell—as explained in Part I.B, supra—left this important 
question of law open, some scholars, such as Professor Bambauer, argue privacy regulations are 
“deliberately designed to disrupt knowledge creation,” and therefore “presumptively illegitimate.”  
Bambauer, supra note 25, at 60, 70.  That position concedes that such a rule would call into question 
almost every existing privacy regime. Id. at 61–62.  However, for the purposes of this Note, both the Court 
and regulators can—as the Court did in Sorrell—side-step an ultimate determination as applied to 
legislation specifically aimed at targeted advertising.  This Note instead identifies a situation in which 
contemplated privacy regulations, while they might incidentally burden some commercial speech, are not 
enacted with the desire—expressed or inferred—to curtail the creation or dissemination of information.  
As long as Internet Information Economy platforms continue to operate free of charge, they are 
fundamentally businesses seeking to advertise as effectively as possible.  For these reasons, the ensuing 
analyses progress from the premise that much of the data at issue contains a commercial nexus and should 
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protections put forward attractive arguments, leveling up the protections structurally 
guts the potential for effective consumer protection. 
B. CLASSIFYING DATA COLLECTION AS ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
The appeal of classifying data collection and transmission as purely economic 
activity, rather than speech, is to obtain the lower rational basis judicial scrutiny of 
data regulations—rather than strict scrutiny, were it speech.  This tier increases the 
likelihood that such regulations would be deemed constitutional.130  The argument 
proceeds from finding that user data is non-expressive and therefore not speech.  This 
is the argument Justice Breyer put forth in his dissent in Sorrell.131  Recall that the 
alternate ground on which the case was decided means that Sorrell does not provide 
clear guidance on the viability of labeling data a commodity.  Instead, the lack of 
binding precedent on this issue provides regulators some leeway. 
Framing data collection and transmission as a passive economic activity treats the 
input of data into a platform as a mere exchange for access.  As an exemplar for the 
ensuing legal analyses, this Note focuses on Facebook’s practices.132  Facebook 
bases its business model upon packaging user data into monetizable and discrete 
bundles of individualized consumer data.  Facebook’s intake of the initial data when 
a user first launches his or her profile is supplemented by tracking cookies and other 
software, which provide continuous forms of data collection back to the platform.  
Effectively, the user has paid in his or her data in order for access to the site.  Each 
continued use functions as a credit to the service platform, which is now amassing a 
warehouse of particularized data. 
 
be evaluated under a separate First Amendment framework.  Further, the specific contents of the 
advertisement are not themselves tailored to the individual; rather, it is the means by which the 
advertisement reaches the consumer, as determined by data collection and transmission practices, which 
are at issue. 
 130. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[R]egulatory legislation 
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of 
the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it 
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”). 
 131. See Part I.B, supra.  The Court in Sorrell expressly declined Vermont’s request that sales, 
transfers and use of prescriber identifying information be treated as non-expressive conduct not speech.  
In fact, the Court ruled that the outcome in the case would be the same regardless of whether it treated the 
information as a “mere commodity.”  Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011). 
 132. At the outset, this Note flagged several recognized platforms that comprise the Internet 
Information Economy, namely, Facebook, Google, Instagram, and LinkedIn.  Each platform operates in 
slightly different ways, whether as a difference in how ad buys are conducted, how the platform stores 
user data, and whether the platform sells the data directly to advertisers or retains it itself to serve as an 
intermediary ‘match-maker’ of sorts between user and advertiser.  This Note will only emphasize 
Facebook.  This selection was made for several reasons:  primarily, the ubiquity of Facebook and the 
recent issues surrounding certain advertisements displayed on the platform have led to calls for some form 
of regulation of the platform directly.  Second, Facebook’s size and popularity worldwide make it a fitting 
subject of analysis.  Third, given Facebook’s penchant for acquiring smaller platforms (i.e. Instagram), 
many participants in the Internet Information Economy are currently or may become part of the Facebook 
‘family.’  See Price of Selected Acquisitions by Facebook as of July 2017 (in Million U.S. Dollars), 
STATISTA, https://perma.cc/4EH7-RQUB (last visited Jan. 9, 2018).  
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According full First Amendment protection to Facebook’s data collection and 
transmission risks overly insulating a commercial transaction from necessary 
economic regulation.  Instead, Facebook serves as a broker for advertisers to 
facilitate the transmission of information.  Matching advertisers with users is not an 
expressive speech act but an economic arrangement, categorically distinct from use 
of the platform to advance political ideas.  Although the users may be engaged in 
speech, it does not necessarily follow that Facebook, the platform, is engaged in 
speech production or expressive conduct per se.  For example, the user’s act of liking 
a politician’s public page indicates an endorsement of that figure.133  The analytical 
gap occurs in claiming Facebook is speaking when, as a result of user activity, that 
user’s data is used to service a relevant ad buy.  The argument delineates speech from 
Facebook’s algorithmic pairing.  However, this framework falters given the 
jurisprudence concerning computer source code holding that the code itself can 
garner First Amendment protection.134 
There remains a fundamental obstacle to classifying data as economic activity.  
Commodities which may appear divorced from speech have, based on a nexus to 
First Amendment protected conduct, been accorded First Amendment protection.  
For example, the Court held an ink and paper tax violated the First Amendment based 
on the burdens it imposed on print media.135  Similarly, circuit courts have concluded 
that computer source code is “an expressive means for the exchange of information 
and ideas about computer programming,” warranting First Amendment 
protections.136 
The doctrinal move to label Facebook-user interactions purely economic appears 
unlikely to garner support either in the Court or among regulators for two reasons:  
(i) prior precedent counters against a bright-line pronouncement that subjects data to 
mere economic regulations;137 and (ii) the Court tends to classify borderline conduct 
as worthy of speech protections, in the interest of erring on the side of promoting 
speaker interests.  The end-stage commoditization of a user’s activity does not rob a 
user’s activity of its inherent speech quality.  In Bland v. Roberts, the Fourth Circuit 
held that a “like” on Facebook both “constituted pure speech” and “symbolic 
expression” in the context of local government officials who had “liked” the 
 
 133. This hypothetical roughly maps onto the facts in Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 
2013).  However, the same logic follows for endorsements of goods and services.  
 134. The difference between computer source code, as any series of computer instructions, and a 
Facebook algorithm that links the data to an advertisement is the latter’s proprietary nature.  
 135. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591 (1983). 
 136. See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000).  Junger sought to freely distribute 
encryption software on his website, which fell under the Export Administration Regulations and would 
require a license to distribute.  After resolving that the code was in fact entitled to First Amendment 
protection, the court remanded for consideration of Junger’s facial challenge to the Regulations.  See also 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 449 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e join the other courts that 
have concluded that computer code, and computer programs constructed from code can merit First 
Amendment protection.”).  
 137. Corley, 273 F.3d at 446–47 (“Even dry information, devoid of advocacy, political relevance, 
or artistic expression, has been accorded First Amendment protection.”); Boelter v. Hearst Commc’ns, 
Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 427, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).  
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Facebook page of a local political candidate.138  The Bland court found the activity 
of liking the page to be the “Internet equivalent of displaying a political sign in one’s 
front yard, which the Supreme Court has held is substantive speech.”139  The 
resulting inquiry is whether ex ante speech is stripped of its speech properties by 
virtue of its downstream uses.  The hybrid nature of data, which both facilitates 
commercial transactions and retains some expressive aspects, suggests that neither 
full First Amendment protection nor lack of such protection is the appropriate path 
to chart.  Instead, the next section considers a third alternative. 
C. DATA USED IN TARGETED SOLICITATION WARRANTS QUALIFIED 
PROTECTION 
1. The Intermediate Scrutiny Framework Vindicates Listener Interests 
Commentators have expressed discomfort at the thought of online users 
unwittingly serving as fodder for commercial activity by virtue of participating in the 
new Internet Information Economy.140  They contend the current bounds of 
commercial speech fail to reach business models that harvest data from users instead 
of charging a fee for service, but nevertheless engage in commercial activity.141  
Likewise, empirical research reveals consumer concern over a general lack of 
transparency over data practices.142 
In keeping with the prevailing—though challenged—framework of applying 
reduced constitutional protections to commercial speech, three factors characterize 
the exchange of data used in targeted advertising between a service platform and an 
advertiser.  First, data transmission for advertising exists in a transactional space.  
The exchanging parties each derive a benefit and are motivated by commercial gain.  
Second, the exchanged data pertains to private matters, or at least touches on matters 
of private concern.143  To be sure, certain inputs that a user might include in a profile 
are publicly available, but the complete aggregation where a digital person emerges 
is distinct.  There exists a spectrum of information that can be collected about an 
individual—ranging from the innocuous to the intrusive.  The degree of privacy 
protections ought to be keyed to the degree of intrusiveness.144  Third, the two-party 
matrix involving the Internet Information Economy platform and the advertiser 
excises the user.  This section considers each of these factors in turn to support the 
conclusion that regulations on data collection and transmission ought not be accorded 
 
 138. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2013).  
 139. Id.  
 140. See Bernstein & Lee, supra note 26. 
 141. Id. at 74.  “[I]n the case of advertisements for free web-based services, the consumer is being 
commodified in a way that he or she might not realize, but that makes the transaction no less commercial.” 
 142. Turow, supra note 3, at 20–21. 
 143. See e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) 
(plurality opinion). 
 144. Privacy, in the Internet age, might be better reframed in light of the user’s expectations that 
certain actions or material shared will not be later used by a third party. 
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full First Amendment protection, but rather fit within the scope of Commercial 
Speech Doctrine. 
First, intermediate scrutiny is appropriate given that the end goal of a data 
exchange is to consummate a commercial transaction.  The foregoing analysis draws 
on companion class action cases heard by the Southern District of New York in 2016 
considering challenges to Michigan’s Preservation of Personal Privacy Act (PPPA) 
and Video Rental Privacy Act (VRPA).  Both state laws “restrict[] the sellers of 
certain products from disclosing the identity of individuals who purchase those 
products.”145  In Boelter v. Advance Magazine Publishers Inc., the parties stipulated 
that the personal information that was disclosed to data miners and later sold in 
aggregated lists constituted speech.146  The court nevertheless found that “even 
outside the advertising context, speech may in certain circumstances be subject to 
less stringent scrutiny based on its ‘plainly commercial nature and effect,’” and 
applied intermediate scrutiny.147 
In Boelter v. Hearst Communications, Inc., the court emphasized the economic 
motivation undergirding the collation of consumer reports detailing “an individual’s 
economic decisions . . . [and] elucidat[ing] an individual’s economic preferences.”148  
Data that is compressed into a readable format “facilitate[s] the proposal of new 
commercial transactions on the part of third parties.”149  Acknowledging the shift to 
an information currency model, the court found that the disclosure of data is 
“primarily, if not entirely—an economic act.”150  Implicit in this analysis is the sense 
that activity in the service of an economic transaction does not reach the lofty goals 
set out for full First Amendment protection. 
Second, either approach of treating consumer purchase reports as effectuating 
privacy interests or as characterizing data as principally commercial lead to an 
application of intermediate scrutiny.  In Boelter v. Advance Magazine Publishers 
Inc., the court acknowledged, “[W]hether the sale of data to third parties for targeted 
solicitation of consumers is commercial speech appears to be an open question in the 
Second Circuit.”151  The general understanding, however, was that it warranted 
qualified protection.152  The Advance Magazine court’s approach to applying the 
intermediate scrutiny tranche is noteworthy because privacy considerations 
surrounding the data precluded a strict scrutiny analysis.153  In light of the Supreme 
Court’s continued discomfort with the scope of commercial speech, an emphasis on 
 
 145. Boelter v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 427, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Boelter v. 
Advance Mag. Publishers Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d 579, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Although drafted to reach a 
broader range of materials than the VPPA, the PPPA pursues a similar objective.”). 
 146. Advance Mag. Publishers Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d at 597.  
 147. Id. (citing Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 95 (2d Cir.2010)).  
 148. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d at 445. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 151. Advance Mag. Publishers Inc., 210 F. Supp. 3d at 597.  
 152. Id. (“The conclusion that this speech should receive intermediate scrutiny is supported by 
several out-of-circuit decisions addressing laws limiting disclosure of personal information to marketers 
based on similar privacy concerns.”). 
 153. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d at 446.  See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 
U.S. 60, 66–68 & n.15 (1983).  
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privacy interests may be a crucial component to effective regulation.154  This finding 
holds in two respects:  (i) strict scrutiny should not be the prism through which data 
regulation is evaluated, and (ii) privacy interests supply the significant government 
interest necessary for a regulation to surpass intermediate scrutiny. 
Third, that the disclosure of consumer data is of interest only to a limited universe 
of persons supports extending qualified, rather than full, First Amendment 
protection.  Robert Post’s participatory conception of the First Amendment suggests 
that commercial speakers enjoy reduced protections because the speech does not 
promote a democratic function.  Further, if the Commercial Speech Doctrine is 
intended to vindicate listener interests, the listener plays no active role in either 
collection or transmission of his data. 
The appeal of preserving an intermediate scrutiny framework is twofold.  
Intermediate scrutiny, as opposed to leveling up to a strict scrutiny framework, 
acknowledges the indispensable role privacy plays in the exchange of the personal 
data.  The test is flexible enough to accommodate a spectrum of data comprising 
varying degrees of privacy interests.  Intermediate scrutiny balances Neil Richards’ 
concern that the calls of Lochner in the Information Age will deny the government’s 
ability to regulate data flows, and Jane Bambauer’s readiness to launch a new 
paradigm for economic transactions that handicaps any regulation ex ante.  To the 
extent data contains speech properties, rational basis is an inappropriate standard of 
review.  Rational basis review is the most deferential standard, an acquiescence by 
the judiciary to the legislative process.155  But when the legislature is engaged in 
curtailing speech, rational basis would undermine the raison d’être of the First 
Amendment as guardian of self-governance and robust critiques of institutions of 
power.156  Privacy interests also caution against applying strict scrutiny to regulations 
seeking to cabin uses of personal data exchanged in a commercial context. 
2. “Step 0” Central Hudson Analysis 
The threshold inquiry for an application of qualified intermediate scrutiny is that 
the speech is lawful and not misleading.  Speech failing to meet this requirement is 
filtered out from any application of the Central Hudson test.  This section considers 
two nascent applications of data collection and transmission of questionable legality 
that have triggered pre-existing laws:  (i) data scraping and (ii) data-driven 
discrimination. 
 
 154. See Part I, supra, discussing the Supreme Court’s application of an increasingly stringent 
Central Hudson test to invalidate recent commercial speech regulations.  
 155. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293, 
305 (2007) (“Generally there’s trust in the legislative process.  So there’s great deference to the legislative 
process; that’s why rational basis is generally used.  But in those instances where we’re very distrustful 
of the legislature, well that’s where strict scrutiny gets used.  And if we’re somewhat distrustful, but not 
as much, it’s intermediate scrutiny.”).  
 156. See, e.g., Post, supra note 81, at 2371–72. 
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a. Data Scraping 
An open issue before the courts is the legality of “data scraping,” a process by 
which third parties use software code to gain access to a service platform and mass 
download data without either the service platform’s or the user’s express consent.157  
Cambridge Analytica’s mechanism of obtaining Facebook user data in Spring 2018 
through a quiz application constituted a form of data scraping.158  Challenges to the 
use of scraping tend to be lodged as violations of pre-existing anti-fraud, privacy, 
and copyright laws.159  The Ninth Circuit is currently considering a high-profile 
appeal that could decide, among other things, the ownership of data placed on social 
media platforms.  That case, hiQ v. LinkedIn, involves a start-up that deploys bots to 
scrape allegedly publicly available data from LinkedIn users’ profile pages.160  As 
emphasized in an amicus brief, “[p]ersonal data is central to this case even though 
users are not represented in this proceeding.”161  hiQ, represented by Professor 
Laurence Tribe, markets its business model as talent-management that is “informed 
by public data sources,”162 including LinkedIn’s “public” data.163  LinkedIn, 
represented by former Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., claims hiQ 
“expropriates member data from LinkedIn’s servers on a massive scale,” then profits 
off the sale of that data.164 
 
 157. Noortje Marres & Ester Weltevrede, Scraping the Social:  Issues in Live Social Research, 6 J. 
CULTURAL ECON. 313, 313 (2013).  Cambridge Analytica’s mechanism of obtaining Facebook user data 
in Spring 2018 via a quiz application constituted a form of data scraping.  
 158. In his testimony submitted to Congress, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg admitted that third 
parties were able to scrape its users’ data.  However, he reiterated Facebook’s policy prohibiting third 
parties from selling or licensing such data and from sharing that data “with any ad network, data broker 
or other advertising or monetization-related service.”  Facebook:  Transparency and Use of Consumer 
Data:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 115th Cong. (2018) (letter submitted by 
Facebook on June 29, 2018 in response to questions supplementing the record), https://perma.cc/2XMJ-
VPG5.  Numerous consumer privacy actions against Facebook and Cambridge Analytica flooded dockets 
across the country alleging that both that Cambridge Analytica “exploited Facebook’s platform to obtain 
user data” and that Facebook failed to impose “more robust controls . . . to prevent this conduct.”  In re 
Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., MDL No. 2843 (J.P.M.L. 2018).  In June 2018, 
these actions were consolidated in the Northern District of California.  Id.  The District Court aggregated 
all relevant materials pertaining to the ongoing case, available at https://perma.cc/5URB-PDG4. 
 159. See Power Ventures v. Facebook, 138 U.S. 313 (cert. denied Oct. 10, 2017); U.S. v. 
Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 529 (3d Cir. 2014) (hacker’s conviction was vacated on improper venue 
grounds after he scraped personal data that was publicly available by virtue of a glitch in AT&Ts code); 
Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Meltwater 
used an automated system to “crawl” the Internet for news in order to compile an index.  The Associated 
Press challenged the practice under the Fair Use doctrine.)  
 160. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 161. Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) in Support of Neither 
Party Urging Reversal, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F.Supp.3d 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (No. 17-
16783), https://perma.cc/2XMJ-VPG5.   
 162. HIQ LABS, https://perma.cc/49FM-WEZS (last visited Oct. 22, 2017).  
 163. hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F.Supp.3d 1099, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (order granting 
preliminary injunction). 
 164. Brief for Appellant, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F.Supp.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 
17-16783).  
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The Northern District of California granted the preliminary injunction for hiQ, 
noting that “[t]he actual privacy interests of LinkedIn users in their public data are at 
best uncertain.”165  It would not be unreasonable for users with a “public view” 
setting to expect that their information would be subject to data collection; in 
uploading information, the user may be relinquishing a privacy right.166  The district 
court wrestled with the implications of according LinkedIn the authority to deny 
access to publicly available information as this move “could pose an ominous threat 
to public discourse and the free flow of information promised by the Internet.”167 
The district court’s order is notable in another respect: it failed to find convincing 
hiQ’s First Amendment claim that LinkedIn is a public forum.  Although hiQ 
obtained its preliminary injunction, it won by challenging the applicability of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)168 and state competition law, not the First 
Amendment.  To be sure, the district court may have impliedly declined to reach the 
First Amendment question on constitutional avoidance grounds.169  However, should 
the Ninth Circuit apply the CFAA to prevent unauthorized data scraping, it will 
reinforce a “step 0” inquiry whereby certain methods of data collection and 
transmission fall outside the scope of protectable speech. 
b. Discrimination in Housing and Employment Advertisements 
Certain data collection and transmission methods—particularly those that 
discriminate along age, racial, and gender170 lines—can result in alleged violations 
of anti-discrimination statutes, including the Fair Housing Act and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.171  Socioeconomic targeting, whereby a consumer’s 
financial profile is gleaned by virtue of prior shopping habits, may also result in 
systematic exclusion of offers to certain consumers.172 
 
 165. hiQ Labs, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1119.  Despite hiQ’s argument, the district court declined to extend 
public forum analysis to the Internet to find LinkedIn is a ‘modern public square.’  
 166. Id. (“It is likely that those who opt for the public view setting expect their public profile will be 
subject to searches, date mining, aggregation, and analysis.”).  
 167. Id. (emphasis added).  
 168. Brief for Appellant at 32, hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 273 F.Supp.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 17-16783).  The CFAA provides for liability for unauthorized access to computers.  
 169. hiQ Labs, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1116.  
 170. In September 2018, the Communications Workers of America and individual job seekers, with 
the assistance of the American Civil Liberties Union, filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission alleging Facebook’s ad platform discriminates against women and nonbinary 
people.  The complaint alleges the platform violates Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on 
Human Rels., 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding a local ordinance banning sex designated advertising for 
employment opportunities).  See Comms. Workers of Am. et al. v. Facebook, Inc. (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/2AYP-XWKM.  
 171. The clash between First Amendment and anti-discrimination statutes is by no means recent.  
See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 172. Currently, socio-economic groups are not considered a constitutionally protected class.  
Julianne Pepitone, Facebook Uses Offline Purchases to Target Ads, CNN (Apr. 11, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/UE4D-V4G6.  For more on targeted advertising based on price discrimination, see Exec. 
Office of the President, Big Data and Differential Pricing, (Feb. 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/docs/Big_Data_Report_None
mbargo_v2.pdf.  
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Facebook’s “Exclude People” button enables advertisers to carve out their desired 
audiences.173  A 2016 ProPublica study found that no mechanism exists “to prevent 
ad buyers from purchasing ads related to employment/housing and then excluding 
based on . . . illegal characteristics,” such as race, sex, or religion.174  In the light of 
this reporting, two class actions—including one filed by the National Fair Housing 
Alliance—are pending in federal court, each challenging “the functioning of 
Facebook’s online advertising tools and alleged discrimination.”175  As of the time 
of publication, the plaintiffs in these actions have joined in settlement negotiations 
with Facebook, which might prevent a full accounting of Facebook’s practices.176 
Though Facebook maintains that Section 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act insulates it from liability,177 it is the platform’s algorithm that matches the 
advertisement with the audience.178  The argument that Facebook has inserted itself 
in the commercial speech arena flows from finding that the algorithm has a speech-
like quality akin to the computer code.179  This threshold inquiry permits liability 
actions for violations of anti-discrimination statutes by determining Facebook has 
shed the role of a disinterested Internet server. 
Customized advertising hosted online reflects a drastic shift from billboards and 
“the classifieds.”180  Online platforms offer the means to deny users access to 
advertisements that marketers have determined are “not of interest.”  This feature 
ensures a user might never discover such discrimination, robbing that user of a 
cognizable injury on which to stake a claim.181  Concern about paternalism—filtering 
 
 173. Facebook Business, About Detailed Targeting, https://perma.cc/9WYC-D7CA (last visited Jan. 
9, 2018).  Part III.C, supra details information about Facebook’s “Custom Audience” feature and “dark 
posts.”  
 174. Compl. ¶ 32, Mobley et al. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016) 
(emphasis added).  See Compl. ¶¶ 59–71, Nat’l Fair Hous. Alliance v. Facebook, Inc., 18-cv-2689-JGK 
(S.D.N.Y Mar. 27, 2018).  The NFHA complaint details how NFHA first made Facebook aware in 2016 
of potential liabilities from using “ethnic affinity marketing,” and Facebook’s response in November 2016 
that it would disable such a feature in credit, housing, and employment advertisements and would begin 
requiring advertisers to “self-certify” compliance with applicable laws.  However, a year later, ProPublica 
reported that Facebook continued to approve discriminatory advertisements that that ProPublica’s 
investigative team had tested.  NFHA then opened its own independent investigation, culminating with its 
formal complaint.  Id. 
 175. Joint Post-Mediation Status Report & [Proposed] Order, Mobley et al. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 
5:16-cv-06440-EJD (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2018) (referencing Nat’l Fair Hous. Alliance v. Facebook, Inc., 
18-cv-2689-JGK (S.D.N.Y Mar. 27, 2018)).  See Compl.  ¶¶ 24–33, Mobley et al. v. Facebook.  
 176. Id. 
 177. Defendant’s Mot. to Dismiss First Am. Compl. 4-14, Mobley et al. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:16-
cv-06440-EJD (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2017) (Plaintiff’s “allegations describe the classic sort of neutral tool 
protected by the CDA . . . which facilitate the publication of third-party content . . . [Such tools] are subject 
to CDA immunity even if the users committed their misconduct using such tools.”  (internal citations 
omitted)).  
 178. Facebook Business, About the Delivery System: Ad Auctions, https://perma.cc/D6WM-FTLD 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2018).  
 179. See, e.g., Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000).  
 180. Although advertisers selected the publication based on readership demographics, any potential 
customer could purchase the magazine or newspaper. 
 181. Compl. ¶ 33, Mobley et al. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016).  
See also Compl. ¶¶ 3–5, Nat’l Fair Hous. Alliance v. Facebook, Inc., 18-cv-2689-JGK (S.D.N.Y Mar. 27, 
2018) (“Discriminatory advertising is just as damaging as discrimination at the point of rental or sale.”).  
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what pertinent information a consumer could receive—motivated the Supreme Court 
when deciding the early commercial speech cases.  Here, a private actor, not the state, 
facilitates cognizable facial discrimination by preferentially selecting certain 
individuals for commercial and housing opportunities. 
3. Privacy as a Substantial Government Interest 
The qualified constitutional protection framework articulated in Central Hudson 
requires that the regulation further a “substantial” government interest.  In the context 
of data collection and transmission, privacy interests are oft-cited grounds upon 
which to regulate.182  That said, the Court has intimated that it is not wildly receptive 
to invocations of privacy as a defensible motivation for regulations which burden the 
exercise of the First Amendment.183  Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that the 
government cannot merely “assert[] a broad interest in privacy” without some 
particular justification.184 
But, as Professor Bhagwat notes, privacy interests are unlike the “highly 
paternalistic approach” which caused consternation among the Justices.185  Concern 
over suppressing the public dissemination of truthful information largely motivated 
the Court’s decision in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc.186  Privacy, however, implicates the individual on a decidedly different 
basis than speech on “matters of public concern” or in non-targeted advertising.187  
Applying Post’s theory, the lack of self-governing principles does not warrant 
increased protections for user data, such as would suggest applying strict scrutiny to 
any proposed regulation.188  Last, privacy exists on a spectrum, suggesting that 
successful regulations will articulate particularized privacy interests.189 
 
 182. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. F.C.C., 555 F.3d 996, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  
 183. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. 
L. REV. 855, 880 n.98 (2012) (collecting cases where the Court invalidated laws restricting truthful 
information for privacy reasons); but see Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995) (“Our 
precedents leave no room for doubt that ‘the protection of potential clients’ privacy is a substantial state 
interest.”).  
 184. U.S. W., Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1234–35 (10th Cir. 1999).  The Tenth Circuit added 
“privacy is not an absolute good because it imposes real costs on society.  Therefore, the specific privacy 
interest must be substantial, demonstrating that the state has considered the proper balancing of the 
benefits and harms of privacy.”  Id. 
 185. Bhagwat, supra note 183, at 871 (quoting Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S., 357, 
375 (2002)). 
 186. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 
(1976) (“What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of concededly 
truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information’s effect upon its 
disseminators and its recipients.”).  The Court went on to note that a “consumer’s interest in the free flow 
of commercial information” may be “as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent 
political debate.”  Id. at 763.  
 187. The advertisements at issue in Virginia Board were non-targeted.   
 188. See Bhagwat, supra note 183, at 877.  
 189. Such disclosures of data in some instances may not implicate the same privacy concerns as 
other disclosures—compare data that illustrate music preferences with data that reveal sensitive financial 
or medical information. 
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IV. SOLUTIONS 
In considering how to structure workable regulations to address issues raised by 
targeted advertising, the factors set out in Edenfield v. Fane190 provide an instructive 
blueprint, more so than lessons gleaned from Sorrell.  Edenfield considers, inter alia, 
(i) the identities of parties involved; (ii) the particular circumstances contextualizing 
the solicitation; (iii) whether the speaker is a “professional trained in the art of 
persuasion;” and (iv) whether the audience is liable to be manipulated.191  These 
factors are flexible to accommodate the technological shift that has moved personal 
solicitations from the bedside of an accident victim to the screen of a Facebook user 
browsing on a personal device.  Facially, distinctions between the two situations are 
readily available.  However, the pervasive nature of certain Internet Information 
Economy platforms and the degree to which personal data can be amassed means 
that communications from such a platform can persist far longer than a mailer. 
A proposal banning personal solicitations lacks practical and legal support.  The 
Internet Information Economy ushered in a revenue model relying principally on 
advertising.  This Note does not seek to uproot this paradigm by advocating that 
Facebook move to a subscription-based model.  Such a solution would be an 
overreach and disfavored under constitutional avoidance.  Nor would current users 
broadly embrace this change having grown accustomed to “free” services.192 
Any proposal in this Part runs into criticisms of paternalism.193  Indeed, the 
majority in Virginia Board grounded its analysis on vindicating the individual’s 
autonomy.194  While the government’s purposeful intervention ought not to be 
blindly sanctioned, claims of paternalism ignore two fundamental differences 
between commercial and non-commercial speech.  First, the commercial speaker, de 
facto, “distorts” dialogue with an audience.195  Second, regulations of commercial 
 
 190. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (describing a framework for evaluating the 
constitutionality of personal solicitation bans).  
 191. Id.  
 192. One survey from 2013 found that only 15% of Facebook users would be willing to pay a 
subscription fee in exchange for seeing no advertisements.  David Cohen, Poll: 15 Percent of Facebook 
Users Would Pay to Avoid Ads, ADWEEK (July 25, 2013) (citing Greenlight’s Search & Social Survey 
(2012-2013)).  Contra Zeynep Tufekci, Mark Zuckerberg, Let Me Pay for Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (June 
4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/opinion/zeynep-tufekci-mark-zuckerberg-let-me-pay-
for-facebook.html?_r=0 (operating from the assumption that a subscription fee would be equivalent to the 
amount each user’s data package is worth to Facebook, currently around 20 cents).  
 193. See C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech 
Quandary in Nike, 54 CAS. W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1173 (2004), https://perma.cc/HTM5-TV5S (“[T]he 
government acts on the belief that a consumer cannot be trusted to take care of herself in deciding about 
tobacco use or gambling or buying from irresponsible cut-rate pharmacists, or to act in a socially 
responsible fashion in deciding on electricity usage, especially during periods of peak demand.  Certainly, 
anyone who sees the underlying premise of the First Amendment to involve a demand that the government 
respect individual autonomy should find such paternalism offensive.”). 
 194. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).  
 195. Baker, supra note 193, at 1174 (“Partly because the views of a commercial speaker are 
structurally determined, the state could reasonably want to exclude this speaker from the discourse-this 
was essentially John Stuart Mill’s suggestion . . . Of course, the exclusion might produce bad 
consequences—but evaluations of this type of trade-off is the normal task of legislative bodies.”).  
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speech need not chill speech.  Rather, as detailed below, harnessing pre-existing 
legislative tools such as the Compelled Speech Doctrine works to increase speech, 
resulting in a more informed consumer audience. 
A. SOLUTIONS WITHIN THE CURRENT DOCTRINAL LANDSCAPE 
1. Maintain the Current Self-Regulatory Framework 
Currently, Internet Information Economy platforms self-regulate, having thus far 
resisted attempts to install a governmental oversight regime.196  The benign neglect 
approach preserves the status quo by refusing to disrupt the technology disrupters. 
Facebook and similar entities could continue to rely on their algorithms, without 
requiring manpower oversight to sift through advertisements or uses of data.197  No 
First Amendment interests are implicated under this model.  This option delays 
determination of whether the data harvested for targeted advertising have speech 
qualities, resists criticism of government action as paternalistic, and avoids inquiring 
into whether consumers are sophisticated parties when sharing data. 
But consumers would not be without recourse, even should the government opt 
not to intervene with a satisfying legal regime.  In response to the “creep” of targeted 
advertising, various self-help remedies have emerged in the Internet space, including, 
inter alia, affirmatively deleting cookies198 or installing ad blocker technology.199  
Plug-ins such as ad blockers function as band-aids—though they prevent the end 
stage commercial speech from reaching the consumer, they fail to restrict any actual 
data collection.  Nevertheless, these patchwork solutions provide at least immediate 
 
 196. In April 2018, Senators Klobuchar and Kennedy introduced a bipartisan bill seeking to impose 
new regulations on Internet Information Economy platforms.  Social Media Privacy Protection and 
Consumer Rights Act of 2018, S. 2728, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018) (hereinafter Social Media Privacy 
Act), https://perma.cc/3BYX-LQUZ.  The proposed legislation contemplates solutions that are found 
throughout this section of the Note, including increased disclosure regarding to what ends data is used, 
requirements to alert users in the event of mishandling of their data.  The bill likewise provides that a user 
may at his discretion “withdraw consent to the terms of service . . . as easily as the user is able to give 
such consent.”  Id. at Sec. 3(a)(3)(A).  As of the time of publication, the bill has yet to pass through either 
Congressional body.   
 197. Such complete hands-off monitoring seems increasingly unlikely.  See discussion of anti-
Semitic attributes, supra note 96.  Facebook has indicated that it will make greater use of human monitors, 
despite the capital costs.   
 198. See Part II.B, supra.  
 199. See, e.g., the “Privacy Badger” plug-in released by Electronic Frontier Foundation. PRIVACY 
BADGER, https://perma.cc/WXB5-N8MA (last visited Oct. 13, 2017).  Some ad blockers, however, are a 
band-aid solution as they merely filter out what a user can see on his/her page.  Adblock Plus or dedicated 
tracking blockers such as Disconnect can prevent tracking that preclude third parties from sending 
advertisements to the page that the user is currently viewing.  Robert L. Mitchell, Ad Blockers:  A Solution 
or a Problem?, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan. 15, 2014), https://perma.cc/7XVB-JSQR;  see Grant Storey et al., 
The Future of Ad Blocking: An Analytical Framework and New Techniques (Working Paper Apr. 14, 
2017), https://perma.cc/8SUF-JNL7.  However, Facebook has responded to the onslaught of ad-blockers 
by altering the structure of their pages such that all items that appear on a Newsfeed look identical 
(regardless of whether they are ads or non-ads) so as to throw ad-blockers off the scent.  Storey, at 6; Mike 
Isaac, Facebook Blocks Ad Blockers, but It Strives to Make Ads More Relevant, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/technology/facebook-ad-blockers.html?_r=0.  
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reprieve and can be implemented on a personal device far faster than any legislation 
will wind its way through Congress. 
2. Robust Compelled Disclosures for Targeted Advertising 
This proposal contemplates a regulation obligating Internet Information Economy 
platforms to disclose to users the specific data points used to service a targeted 
advertisement, thereby revealing why the user was seeing a particular advertisement.  
Requiring disclosure of the sources driving the advertisements would not be 
viewpoint-discriminatory, under Sorrell, so as to subject it to heightened scrutiny.  
This proposal has implicit support within the industry itself:  in 2014, Facebook 
announced installation of “Why am I seeing this Ad,” which accompanies each 
advertisement it displays for a user.200  Facebook launched this initiative in response 
to concerns that advertisements had gotten too “personal.”201  Addressing backlash 
from “dark posts,” Facebook is currently testing a feature whereby any user may 
view all advertisements that an advertiser is currently running.202  A regulation would 
merely codify what platforms have demonstrated a willingness to implement. 
Informing consumers as to how their data is used in targeted advertising 
empowers them to alter their behavior in response and addresses the asymmetrical 
relationship between consumers and data marketers.203  Assuming industry 
compliance, the drawback to such a solution is user saturation:  depending on the 
configuration of the disclosure, a user may find innumerable data points in service 
of advertisements.  Yet, providing this information enables the individual to evaluate 
whether he deems the data relatively innocuous or worthy of affirmative action.  
Thus, this proposal vindicates a primary objective of the Commercial Speech 
Doctrine. 
Compelled disclosure in Commercial Speech Doctrine, while a nascent area of 
First Amendment jurisprudence, functions as a means to prevent consumer 
deception.204  A compelled disclosure regulation regarding an advertisement that did 
not otherwise change the content of the speech nor its intended audience would likely 
be subject to a low tier of scrutiny.  Scholars have proposed that disclosures in a 
 
 200. Facebook Help Center, How Does Facebook Decide Which Ads to Show Me and How Can I 
Control the Ads I See?, https://perma.cc/5KCJ-9AK6 (last visited Jan. 5, 2018).  See also Improving the 
Control You Have Over Advertising on Facebook (June 12, 2014, 6:07 AM), https://perma.cc/G5BT-
NXE6. 
 201. Cotton Delo, Facebook to Use Web Browsing History for Ad Targeting, ADAGE (June 12, 
2014), https://perma.cc/K8CA-NXNC.  
 202. VICE News, Everything You Need to Know About the Hidden Ways Facebook Ads Target You, 
YOUTUBE (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EM1IM2QUYjk. 
 203. See Turow, supra note 3, at 21.  
 204. See Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650–51 (1985) 
(highlighting the “material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on 
speech” and holding that “an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure 
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”).  
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commercial context aiming to inform the public and not to “spread[] the 
government’s normative message” ought to be subject to rational basis review.205 
In markets susceptible to “manipulation,” Edenfield advises that consumers not 
be kept in the dark so as to benefit “professional[s] trained in the art of 
persuasion.”206  Empirical evidence establishes that exposure to targeted advertising 
changes viewer’s perception of himself or herself, underscoring that targeted 
advertising can manipulate its audience.207  This research indicates that targeted 
advertising operates on the minds of viewers differently than non-targeting 
advertising, a fact weighing in favor of regulation.  The algorithm matching 
advertisement with consumer is designed to drill down to ever more granular levels.  
It is therefore irrelevant whether the advertiser is an experienced marketer or 
amateur, provided that they seek to have their messages displayed on an Internet 
Information Economy platform.208 
3. Opt-in Mechanism for Data Collection 
At present, advertising platforms operate with opt-out mechanisms, whereby 
users must affirmatively decline to have their activity and data collected and used.209  
This proposal advocates for an opt-in procedure where users consent to be tracked.210  
 
 205. Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First 
Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 543 (2012).  
 206. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775 (1993).  
 207. Rebecca Walker Reczek et al., Targeted Ads Don’t Just Make You More Likely to Buy – They 
Can Change How You Think About Yourself, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/6RRF-
JU48 (“The data show that participants [in the study] evaluated themselves as more sophisticated after 
receiving an ad that they thought was individually targeted to them, compared to when they thought the 
same ad was not targeted.  In other words, participants saw the targeted ad as reflective of their own 
characteristics.  The ad told them that, based on their browsing history, they had sophisticated tastes.  They 
accepted this information, saw themselves as more sophisticated consumers, and this shift in how they 
saw themselves increased their interest in the sophisticated product.”); for the full study, see Christopher 
A. Summers et al., An Audience of One: Behaviorally Targeted Ads as Implied Social Labels, 43 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 156 (2016).  
 208. See Nicholas Carlson, How to Buy a Facebook Ad in 15 Minutes or Less, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 
17, 2009), https://perma.cc/SY4S-3HYP (illustrating the ease of using Facebook’s ‘self-service’ 
advertisements).  Injecting the algorithm into the mix is the easiest distinction between targeted advertising 
conducted offline and what is hosted by an Internet Information Economy platform.  
 209. See, e.g., Google Ads Help, Opt Out of Seeing Personalized Ads, https://perma.cc/529K-CTSQ 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2018) (detailing, also, the limits to the opt-out regime, including that opting-out cannot 
remove advertisements altogether, and that the opt-out function may not perfectly map onto mobile 
technologies).  
 210. See Joseph A. Tomain, Online Privacy & the First Amendment:  An Opt-in Approach to Data 
Processing, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 63 (2014) for an in-depth survey of the constitutionality of moving to 
an opt-in framework.  Tomain concludes that the Central Hudson prongs uphold his proposed opt-in 
regime, by finding sufficient government interests in “protecting the privacy of individuals, preventing 
overreaching of data processors, and avoiding the commodification of natural persons.”  The proposal, by 
its nature, is narrowly tailored and merely “ensures that online commercial actors cannot process data 
without first receiving affirmative, express, and informed consent.”  See also Zeynep Tufekci, We Already 
Know How to Protect Ourselves from Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/opinion/zuckerberg-testify-congress.html.  The Social Media 
Privacy Act requires that the user be sufficiently informed and allowed to specify individualized privacy 
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An opt-in framework vindicates the rationales of the Doctrine—to protect the listener 
and his right to receive information, cognizant of the “hardiness” of commercial 
speech to buck against regulation.211  At its core, this approach restores the user as 
the owner of his data, to be shared consensually.212  The right to receive information 
is not derivative of the commercial speaker’s right to disseminate information, which 
suggests that the consumer should be the party who affirmatively makes the decision 
to opt-in. 
Opting in does not envision wiping away advertisements in light of economic 
inertia, nor does it presuppose that a user de facto assents to his online activity being 
tracked.  Rather, a user can select either to receive non-targeted advertisements or to 
assent to being tracked for future targeted advertisements.  If platforms and 
advertisers are correct in their conclusion that targeted advertising represents a boon 
for all parties, an informed and rational consumer will choose to opt in voluntarily.213 
B. SOLUTIONS REQUIRING ALTERATIONS TO THE DOCTRINE 
1. Explicitly Expanding the Definition of “Commercial Speech” 
This two-step process merely codifies economic changes.  First, “commercial 
speech” must stretch beyond the confines articulated in either Virginia Board or 
Central Hudson to capture the types of data-for-services transactions in the Internet 
Information Economy.  Second, consumer data is conceived not as a “matter of 
public concern.” 
This Note began with a reference to Bernstein and Lee’s proposed expansion of 
commercial speech.214  The ensuing sections have built upon this initial premise by 
illustrating how participants in the Internet Information Economy monetize the user 
experience by relying on input data to drive targeted advertising, and by focusing on 
the privacy interests also at play in a viable regulatory scheme.  Narrowly defined 
commercial speech that omits these data collection and transmission methods 
excludes much of the commercially flavored activity of the Internet Information 
 
preferences, including agreeing to the terms of service and prohibiting the collection of data should the 
user so desire. S. 2728, §3(a)(1)(A).  
 211. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 
(1980) (“commercial speech, the offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of expression that 
is not particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 212. U.S. legislators can look to the European Union’s approach to data protection for a cross-border 
example and support for legally mandated user opt-in.  In Spring 2018, the European Union implemented 
the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (“GDPR”), a comprehensive overhaul of data 
privacy legislation.  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, OJ 2016 L 119/1 [hereinafter GDPR].  The 
GDPR establishes a rigorous compliance regime for companies that process individual data.  “Consent” 
is defined as “any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes 
by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing 
of personal data relating to him or her.”  GDPR, art. 4(11) (emphasis added).  Further, “[s]ilence, pre-
ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent.”  Id. para. 32.  
 213. See Nelson, supra note 3.  
 214. See Bernstein & Lee, supra note 26.  
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Economy.215  Judicial intransigence would foreclose evaluating the above-detailed 
solutions under intermediate scrutiny and, instead, would subject data-driven 
targeted advertising to the more stringent, strict scrutiny standard of review. 
2. Expanding Liability Under the Communications Decency Act 
As discussed above in Part III.C, violations of pre-existing laws such as anti-
discrimination statutes, fall outside the qualified constitutional protection matrix.  
The current legal regime under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,216 
however, insulates Internet Information Economy platforms from liability, where the 
platforms are not content generators, despite their hospitality to advertisers operating 
with discriminatory intent.217  As applied, Section 230 provides federal and state 
immunity for “service providers,”218 defeating most claims brought against 
Facebook and similar interactive service providers at the initial stages of litigation.219 
This proposed shift in liability acknowledges that the new paradigm of 
employment and housing advertisements entails users engaged in job hunting on sites 
like Facebook and LinkedIn.  Similarly, the majority of American adults who are 
active on Facebook consume news not from reading newspapers, but via curated 
“Newsfeeds.”220  In this respect, the Internet Information Economy—and the 
algorithms connecting users to a curated experience—have moved away from mere 
passive conduits of information, warranting an update to the legal regime. 
3. Regulating Social Media Platforms as “Utilities” 
A final approach considers regulating Internet Information Economy platforms as 
broadcasters, considering the displacement of traditional broadcasters in favor of the 
Internet as the primary source of communication and the impact of quasi-
 
 215. This concern is likewise shared by Tomain, supra note 210, at 44 (“If the current definition of 
commercial speech does not include data processing by commercial actors, then the definition ought to be 
expanded to include this substantial area of our information economy”).  
 216. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act establishes that “No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
 217. See discussion Part III.C.2, supra, on current litigation regarding the degree to which 
Facebook’s advertising auction platform results in discrimination along the metrics used to identify 
viewers.  
 218. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1169 
n.24 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (§ 230 extends to claims “under state or federal law”).  
 219. But see Mobley et al. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD, 2016 WL 6599689 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 3, 2016).  Although Facebook moved to dismiss the complaint in June 2017, asserting, inter alia, 
Section 230 immunity, the parties have since moved into an allegedly productive mediation phase, 
resulting in a request to the court to stay a ruling on Facebook’s motion.  Joint Post-Mediation Status 
Report & [Proposed] Order in Mobley et al. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD (N.D. Cal. Oct. 
27, 2017).  As of October 15, 2018, the parties are continuing to engage in mediation discussions, while 
still preparing for the December Motion to Dismiss hearings.  Joint Status Report, Mobley et al. v. 
Facebook Inc., No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2018).  
 220. Jeffrey Gottfried & Elisa Shearer, News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016, PEW RES. 
CTR. (May 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/A78T-NLET.  
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monopolistic actors.221  Labeling these platforms as such will enable legislators to 
apply consumer protections more easily.222  Traditional broadcasters are unable to 
personalize advertisements, thus ensuring a “strong disincentive[] . . . to disseminate 
materially false, inflammatory, or contradictory messages to the public.”223  The lack 
of such a check within the Internet Information Economy warrants regulations on 
commercial speech, mindful of the need to ensure the individual consumer is 
apprised of neither misleading nor fraudulent statements. 
However, a few structural distinctions between traditional broadcasters and 
Internet Information Economy platforms undermine this proposal.  First, whereas 
traditional broadcast traded access to airwaves on governmental regulation, the 
Internet suffers from no literal analogous “scarcity” issue.  The response is that 
Facebook and similar entities such as Google operate as de facto monopolies 
bolstered by network effects and high user engagement.224  Second, while platforms 
in the Internet Information Economy may function in practice as broadcasters, 
imposing a broadcast regulatory framework would represent an ex post solution, 
compared to government’s ex ante decision to license traditional broadcasters.  
Third, platforms in the Internet Information Economy, unlike traditional 
broadcasters, function as troves of user data, whereas broadcasters contract with third 
party firms such as Nielsen to acquire information regarding trends in viewership.225  
Characterizing Internet Information Economy participants as dispensaries for news 
glosses over the role they also play as commercialized data banks and risks losing 
the hook to labeling their conduct as commercial speech. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the Internet Information Economy has democratized information sharing, 
a gap in the law persists regarding its data collection and transmission practices.  This 
Note has proposed initiatives derived from first principles of the Commercial Speech 
Doctrine in order to address a lack of transparency and the individual’s loss of 
 
 221. This radical approach to regulate social media platforms as utilities garnered some bipartisan 
support from members in both the Obama and Trump administrations.  Further, over a decade ago, Mark 
Zuckerberg emphasized “the utility component” of Facebook. Laura Locke, The Future of Facebook, 
TIME (July 17, 2007), https://perma.cc/EB3D-2P2C. 
 222. In the wake of accusations that Facebook failed to police adequately purchasers of ad space 
during the 2016 election season, a bipartisan group of Senators introduced a proposed bill, the “Honest 
Ads Act.”  Although targeted specifically at regulating political advertisements, the bill highlights the fact 
that “social media platforms . . . can target portions of the electorate with direct, ephemeral advertisements 
on the basis of private information the platform has on individuals.”  The Honest Ads Act is cabined in 
scope to political advertisements made online but the reasoning can encompass similar concerns in any 
targeted advertisement.  Honest Ads Act, S. 1989, 115th Cong., https://perma.cc/7D22-RJZV. 
 223. Id.  
 224. Darwin Capital Management, Facebook’s Network Effects, Innovative Culture, and Valuable 
Assets, SEEKING ALPHA (June 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/4SHJ-J56A. 
 225. See CBS Radio Contract with Nielsen Unlocks Trove of New Audience Data, INSIDE RADIO 
(May 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/HZY5-GKJB.  However, the value of having firsthand information about 
viewers is clearly evident about traditional broadcasters as evidenced by the relatively recent jump to 
online streaming services, a byproduct of which is that broadcasters have access to that information 
directly.  
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autonomy surrounding personalized commercial speech.  Recognizing a substantial 
government interest in preventing listener deception and manipulation and cognizant 
of limitations imposed by the First Amendment, the proposals contained in this Note 
do not advocate for reduced speech, nor do they segment out commercial speakers.  
Rather, any proposals would increase relevant speech to assist the consumer. 
Data collection and transmission practices represent the new paradigmatic way in 
which commercial speakers interact with their audiences.  To the extent that First 
Amendment scholars seek to protect data related activity, their arguments should be 
grounded on a commercial speech paradigm that embraces first principles, rather 
than shoehorning arguments into the Supreme Court’s increasingly speaker focused 
commercial speech jurisprudence.  Ultimately, the solutions advocated for here can 
engender a market place of ideas through the Internet Information Economy that is 
informationally-symmetric for both speakers and listeners in a manner that is 
designed to fulfill the First Amendment potential of new and social media. 
